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OUT-TECHING PRODUCTS LIABILITY: REVIVING STRICT 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN AN AGE OF AMAZON 
Ryan Bullard* 
From humble beginnings as an internet start-up in the mid–
1990s, Amazon has transformed itself into the prodigious and 
omnipresent e-commerce Leviathan of the early twenty-first century, 
cashing in on a society and economy increasingly comfortable 
with — and dependent on — technology-based services. In addition 
to its recent forays into brick-and-mortar grocery stores, film and 
television production, fast-fashion, cloud computing, consumer data 
analytics, and delivery and logistics services, Amazon is most well-
known as the force behind a multi-billion dollar online marketplace 
where its own products are listed for sale next to products listed by 
third-party vendors. 
Grievous injuries and property damage resulting from defective 
third-party products sold through Amazon’s marketplace have been 
the issue of a number of recent lawsuits alleging strict products 
liability against Amazon itself. The courts that heard these cases 
refused to extend strict liability to Amazon, but this recent 
development argues that these decisions run afoul of the spirit of the 
American strict products liability regime that emerged in the mid–
twentieth century. American courts recognized that the imposition 
of strict liability on manufacturers, distributors, and retailers alike 
for injuries caused by defective products that they placed into the 
consumer marketplace had multiple desirable social purposes that 
warranted shifting the loss from consumers to members of the 
distribution chain. 
After briefly surveying the history and intent behind the original 
American strict products liability regime, this recent development 
explores how Amazon “out-teched” products liability in four recent 
cases and considers why the current standard of negligence is 
insufficient to protect consumers in the modern economy. It 
                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2020. 
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concludes with an explanation of how and why courts should refocus 
their jurisprudence on the original policy goals expressed in the 
seminal products liability cases of the mid-twentieth century. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................183 
II.  PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES .....................184 
A.  History of Products Liability Law .................................184 
B. Policy and Law of Strict Liability ..................................189 
1. Social Responsibility ...............................................189 
2. Loss-Spreading .......................................................190 
3. Incentivizing a Safer Marketplace for Consumers .191 
III.  OUT-TECHING PRODUCTS LIABILITY .................................192 
A. Amazon’s Distribution Methods for Third-Party Vendors
 ......................................................................................193 
1. Fulfillment by Amazon ............................................193 
2. Fulfillment by Merchant .........................................195 
3. Seller-Fulfilled Prime .............................................196 
B.  The Implication of Distribution Methods on Amazon’s 
Liability for Defective Products ....................................196 
1. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc. ...............................197 
2. Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company v. 
Amazon.com, Inc. ...................................................199 
3. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc. ........................................203 
4. Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc. ................................205 
IV.  LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS .....................................................206 
A.  Amazon: Merely an Online Marketplace? ....................207 
B.  The Improper Fixation on “Title” in Eberhart, Fox, and 
Allstate ..........................................................................211 
V.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS .....................................................214 
A. Incentivizing a Safer Marketplace for Consumers .......215 
B.  Profit and Benefit: Social Responsibility ......................217 
C.  Equitably Spreading Losses ..........................................221 
D.  Revisiting Objections: Isn’t Negligence Enough? ........223 
1. The “Unreachable” Problem .................................224 
2. Negligent Misrepresentation...................................227 
3. Negligent Failure to Warn ......................................228 
MAY 2019] Out-Teching Products Liability 183 
E.  Recognizing the Need for Evolution in Strict Products 
Liability .........................................................................229 
VI.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................232 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
First-year law students across the United States learn in their 
introductory torts classes that any entity in the manufacturing, 
distribution, or retail chain of a defective product can be held liable 
for injuries that result from that defective product.1 This theory of 
strict liability for defective products, first articulated by California 
Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor in 1944, was widely adopted 
in the United States throughout the mid-twentieth century.2 This 
doctrine, as with tort law generally, showed a remarkable ability to 
evolve over time, adapting to a changing economy in order to most 
effectively protect consumers.3 Over the past twenty years, an 
increasingly interconnected and modernizing global economy has 
given rise to e-commerce behemoths like Amazon.com. This 
incredible change in the consumer market calls for a corresponding 
evolution in the law of products liability; however, courts have so 
far failed to facilitate the legal progress necessary to protect 
consumers. 
In a recent ruling from the Southern District of New York, 
Amazon was relieved of any test of strict liability for an allegedly 
defective product that a consumer bought through the online 
retailer’s “Fulfillment By Amazon” service.4 This is not the first 
instance in which Amazon has escaped strict products liability under 
similar circumstances, and a string of cases in the last two years has 
reinforced Amazon’s position that it is merely an “online 
                                                 
 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 2 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) 
(Traynor, J., concurring). 
 3 See infra notes 30, 48, and accompanying text. 
 4 Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 400–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(holding that Amazon was neither a seller nor distributor of the defective product 
because it never “held title” to the product, and therefore could not be held strictly 
liable for injuries caused by it). 
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marketplace,” and not a product distributor responsible for placing 
defective products into consumers’ hands.5 
This recent development will consider why that analysis of 
Amazon’s role in the modern economy is erroneous and results in 
judicial outcomes that are incongruous with the original intent and 
rationales behind the American strict products liability regime. Part 
II offers an in-depth discussion of the history of products liability in 
the United States. The string of four recent cases where Amazon out-
teched strict products liability will be discussed in Part III. The 
misapplication of legal standards in classifying Amazon’s role in the 
distribution chain will be discussed in Part IV. In Part V, this recent 
development will revisit the larger policy goals of tort law, including 
deterrence, loss distribution, corrective justice, and fair 
compensation to victims of unintentional negligence, and it will 
show that the holdings in the cases described in Part III are 
antagonistic to those goals. Part VI will briefly conclude that courts 
should refocus their analysis to more closely adhere to the original 
policy intent of strict products liability. 
II.  PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  History of Products Liability Law 
Originally, common law recovery for injuries caused by 
defective products depended upon the existence of privity between 
the injured party and the manufacturer.6 This requirement came to 
                                                 
 5 See Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *3 
(M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018); see also Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc, 
No. 17–2738, 2018 WL 3546197 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018). See generally Oberdorf 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (finding that Amazon 
was more like a newspaper classified ads section than a seller or distributor of 
goods). 
 6 See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. Ch. 1842) 
(foreseeing the possibility of an “infinity of actions . . . [because if] the plaintiff 
can sue [though lacking privity], every passenger, or even any person passing 
along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a 
similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the 
parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to 
which I can see no limit, would ensue.”); see also Privity of Contract, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The relationship between the parties to a 
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be a “fishbone in the throat of the law” that reflected the 
socioeconomic climate of the nineteenth century and a judicial 
hesitancy to place heavy burdens on the manufacturers that drove 
economic growth.7 American courts latched onto the English 
common law principle that privity was required to maintain a tort 
action.8 Exceptions soon developed, however, particularly for torts 
in relatively new or innovative industries which were often 
hazardous, such as pharmacology in the mid-1800s.9 Further 
evolutions in the law occurred in the early 1900s as a result of 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.10 In that case, the New York Court 
of Appeals added an element of negligence, and stated: 
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life 
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger . . . 
. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will 
be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, 
then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is 
under a duty to make it carefully . . . . We have put aside the notion that 
the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence 
may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put 
the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source 
in the law.11 
                                                 
contract, allowing them to sue each other but preventing a third party from doing 
so. The requirement of privity has been relaxed under modern laws and doctrines 
of implied warranty and strict liability, which allow a third-party beneficiary or 
other foreseeable user to sue the seller of a defective product.”). 
 7 W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON: THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 
681 (5th ed. 1984). 
 8 See, e.g., The Germania, 10 F. Cas. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1878) (No. 5360); see also 
The Mary Stewart, 10 F. 137, 139 (E.D. Va. 1881) (“[W]here a party is delinquent 
in a duty imposed by contract, no one but a party to the contract can maintain an 
action.”). 
 9 See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 397 (1852) (finding a duty of care in 
the absence of privity). The pharmacist in question mislabeled a bottle containing 
poisonous belladonna as dandelion extract, which is harmless. Id. He then 
negligently provided the belladonna to Mrs. Winchester, who suffered substantial 
acute health complications. Id. The court ruled that the pharmacist put her life in 
“imminent danger,” and her husband was allowed to bring suit. Id. The pharmacist 
owed the plaintiff a duty of care that was not dependent on a contractual 
relationship; instead, the duty arose from the danger of the pharmaceutical 
business and heightened safety concerns with respect to ingested products. Id. 
 10 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 11 Id. at 1053. 
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The holding in MacPherson stood for the proposition that “the 
manufacturer was liable for negligence to a purchaser if he put forth 
a product which might reasonably be expected to be capable of 
inflicting substantial harm if it were defective.”12 MacPherson is 
significant because it conclusively removed the privity requirement 
as a barrier to recovery in defective products liability cases, at least 
in New York.13 Thus, by the time MacPherson was decided, the 
general rule of nonliability for manufacturers, sellers, and 
distributors had been whittled away by a number of exceptions, 
largely leaving a showing of negligence as the plaintiff’s only 
burden in a products liability case. 
Eventually, a trio of products liability cases in California 
introduced a theory of strict liability for defective products. The first 
of these cases, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,14 was 
the most influential for the theory of strict liability introduced in its 
concurring opinion.15 Although the majority held that the defendant 
was liable on a negligence theory similar to the one in MacPherson, 
California Justice Roger Traynor’s concurrence has been 
instrumental in the development of the strict products liability 
regime in the United States. His concurrence stated that “a 
manufacturer [should] incur[] an absolute liability when an article 
that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used 
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to 
human beings.”16 His comprehensive articulation of the 
justifications for the imposition of strict liability on manufacturers 
for injuries caused by defective products was the basis for the 
                                                 
 12 Francis J. O’Brien, The History of Products Liability, 62 TUL. L. REV. 313, 
318 (1988). 
 13 See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1055 (Bartlett, C.J., dissenting) (stating the 
majority was discarding the general rule that “[the] furnisher of an article is not 
liable to third parties who have no contractual relations with him for negligence 
in the construction, manufacture, or sale of such article”). 
 14 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
 15 See id. 
 16 Id. at 461 (Traynor, J., concurring) (explaining why the concurrence sought 
to apply a strict theory of liability, as opposed to the theory of res ipsa loquitur 
that the controlling opinion in the case used to find liability). 
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opinions which later implemented an American strict products 
liability regime.17 
Almost twenty years after his concurrence in Escola, Justice 
Traynor wrote the majority opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products18 to reflect the conclusions he had reached with respect to 
strict products liability.19 In Greenman, the California Supreme 
Court held that “it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was 
injured while using the [product] in a way it was intended to be used 
as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff 
was not aware that made the [product] unsafe for its intended use.”20 
                                                 
 17 See, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 
858, 865–66 (1986) (applying the strict liability principles set forth in Escola to 
admiralty law); Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 920–21 (5th Cir. 
1964) (approving of Traynor’s concurrence in Escola). 
 18 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
 19 See generally id. Notably, the true first-in-time “strict products liability” 
majority opinion came in Henningson v. Bloomfield, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), where 
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the driver of an automobile who was not 
the title-holder (and therefore not in privity with the manufacturer or dealer) could 
hold both the manufacturer and the dealer liable for injuries caused by a defective 
steering gear, even in the absence of negligence. 
 The two later California cases (Greenman and Vandermark) are notable chiefly 
due to their direct continuity from Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in Escola, 
which was the first concurrence to assert a theory of strict products liability. After 
Escola, but prior to Henningson, there were a series of cases that managed to 
assert strict products liability theories in dicta while also finding negligence or 
privity on the facts of the case. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 
F.2d 501, 506 (10th Cir. 1959) (holding that “[a] plaintiff’s case does not fail for 
failure to allege and prove privity between the parties,” but ultimately finding 
liability due to an implied warranty of fitness that ran to the decedent and was 
breached by the manufacturer); Beck v. Spindler, 99 N.W.2d 670, 680–83 (Minn. 
1959) (holding that privity of contract is not required for liability to be found, but 
ultimately finding that the defendant-manufacturer was a party to the sale, giving 
rise to privity, and that the defendant negligently breached express and implied 
warranties to the plaintiff); Spence v. Three Rivers Bldg. & Masonry Supply, 90 
N.W.2d 873, 880–81 (Mich. 1958) (discussing the potential benefits of 
abandoning the general rule of nonliability that has been “eaten away by 
exceptions,” but ultimately finding the defendant liable for the plaintiff’s injuries 
due to negligence). 
 20 Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901. 
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In other words, the manufacturer was held strictly liable for the 
defective design and manufacture of its product.21 
One year later, Traynor wrote the last of three seminal products 
liability opinions for a unanimous California Supreme Court in 
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,22 which held that non-
manufacturing retailers and distributors can be strictly liable for 
improper assembly or adjustment during the manufacturing 
process.23 Subsequent decisions have held other types of third-
parties strictly liable for manufacturing or design defects, including 
some corporate successors,24 franchisors,25 and promoters.26 In 
contrast, some courts have refused to apply strict liability to groups 
such as used-goods sellers27 or companies that finance purchases 
made by others.28 Additionally, courts have held that strict liability 
extends beyond the purchaser to parties like bystanders.29 
                                                 
 21 Id. 
 22 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964). 
 23 See id. at 171–72 (“In some cases the retailer may be the only member of [the 
overall producing and marketing] enterprise reasonably available to the injured 
plaintiff. In other cases the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring 
that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the 
manufacturer to that end; the retailer’s strict liability thus serves as an added 
incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords 
maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the 
defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the 
course of their continuing business relationship.” (emphasis added)). 
 24 See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977). 
 25 See Kosters v. Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347, 351 (6th Cir. 1979). 
 26 See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967). 
 27 See Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Or. 1979); see also 
Wilke v. Woodhouse Ford, Inc., 774 N.W.2d 370, 381 (Neb. 2009) (holding that 
a used-goods seller can be held liable only if found to be negligent) (“[A] 
commercial dealer of used vehicles has a duty to conduct a reasonable inspection 
of the vehicle prior to sale in order to determine whether there are any patent 
defects which would make the vehicle unsafe for ordinary operation.”). 
 28 See generally Nath v. Nat’l Equip. Leasing Corp., 439 A.2d 633 (Pa. 1981) 
(refusing to apply strict liability in a suit brought by a worker whose hand was 
injured in the machine his employer had financed through the defendant). 
 29 See, e.g., Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969) (“If 
anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the consumer or 
user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably foreseeable . . . . The 
public policy which protects the driver and passenger of the car should also protect 
the bystander, and where a driver or passenger of another car is injured due to 
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Regardless of judicial extension or constraint of the doctrine, the 
policy justifications set forth in Justice Traynor’s original Escola 
concurrence were a constant force in the evolution of strict products 
liability. 
B. Policy and Law of Strict Liability 
When Justice Traynor wrote his influential concurrence in 
Escola, he recognized the need for products liability law to evolve 
over time as industrially modernized, mass-produced products 
became more prevalent and more dangerous, and public opinion 
shifted toward resisting the insulation of manufacturers from tort 
liability rather than prioritizing profit above all else.30 In Escola and 
Greenman, Traynor was cognizant of the importance of loss-
spreading, as well as a moralistic type of liability based on social 
responsibility.31 Additionally, he noted the potential for a strict 
products liability regime to incentivize the creation of safer 
products.32 
1. Social Responsibility 
Traynor’s principle policy justification for his concurrence in 
Escola was that liability should be fixed on the party most 
responsible for its introduction into the marketplace.33 He asserted 
                                                 
defects in the manufacture of an automobile and without any fault of their own, 
they may recover from the manufacturer . . . .”). 
 30 Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict 
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 364 (1965) (“It took time, a long stretch of it from 
1842’s Winterbottom v. Wright to 1916’s MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 
for the courts to articulate their disquiet over the ever-widening zones in which 
the defective products of enterprise were set loose . . . . In many an opinion the 
question festered without satisfactory answer: Can enterprise hew to the line of 
the profit margin only by letting its victims fall where they may, redressing no 
more than the privity-privileged?”). 
 31 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944); 
see also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) 
(“The purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting 
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on 
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect 
themselves.”). 
 32 Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–41. 
 33 Id. at 441 (“If such products nevertheless find their way into the market it is 
to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause 
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that the liability to the consumer is not fixed by contract or the “law 
of sales”; rather, “the warranty of the manufacturer to the consumer 
in absence of privity of contract rests on public policy.”34 “The 
consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for 
himself the soundness of a product . . . and his erstwhile vigilance 
has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up 
confidence by advertising and marketing . . . .”35 Therefore, he 
argued, it was just, from a policy perspective, to attach liability to 
the party who put a defective product on the open marketplace for 
consumers to purchase.36 
2. Loss-Spreading 
Moreover, Traynor argued that not only should losses fall on the 
parties most responsible for placing defective products on the 
consumer market, but there is a sound economic rationale for such 
burden shifting. Traynor expounded on this loss-spreading policy 
rationale in his Escola concurrence.37 He wrote: 
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet 
its consequences. The cost of injury and the loss of time or health may 
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, 
for the risk of the injury can be insured by the manufacturer and 
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business . . . . However 
intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they 
may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general 
one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection 
and the manufacturer is best suited to afford such protection.38 
Traynor later stated in Vandermark that “strict liability on the 
manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the 
                                                 
upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the 
product, is responsible for its reaching the market.”). 
 34 Id. at 442 (citing, inter alia, Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 93 P.2d 799, 
803 (Cal. 1939); Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); and 
Decker & Sons v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1942)). 
 35 Id. at 443. 
 36 See Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 473 (N.J. 1986) (“The 
overriding goal of strict products liability is to protect consumers and promote 
product safety. Manufacturers, by the act of marketing their products, are made 
responsible to the public for injuries caused by those products — the ‘reparative’ 
function.”). 
 37 Escola, 150 P.2d at 441. 
 38 Id. 
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injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they 
can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the course 
of their continuing business relationship.”39 Essentially, Traynor 
argued that it would be most economically efficient for 
manufacturers and retailers to bear the cost of risk due to defective 
products because they are best situated to account for such cost in 
the price of their goods.40 This way, the risk can be thinly spread 
among a large number of consumers via nominal price increases.41 
3. Incentivizing a Safer Marketplace for Consumers 
The final policy rationale that Traynor identified for the 
imposition of a strict products liability regime is that it incentivizes 
safe products, not just reasonably careful manufacturing processes.42 
He argued that “[i]t is to the public interest to discourage the 
marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public. 
If such products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to 
the public interest to [impose strict liability].”43 
Since Traynor’s foundational concurrence in Escola and his 
opinions in Greenman and Vandermark, the Restatement’s 
interpretation of the law has been that “[o]ne engaged in the business 
of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes 
a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or 
property caused by the defect.”44 The Restatement closely matches 
the policy intent of Escola, Greenman, and Vandermark, 
                                                 
 39 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 172 (Cal. 1964) (“Retailers 
like manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the 
public.”). 
 40 For a more complete discussion of the theories underlying the distributive 
rationales that underpin tort law generally, see Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts 
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1970). But see 
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 
(1972) (questioning whether distributive rationales are an appropriate basis for the 
imposition of liability, and instead arguing that corrective rationales may be 
fairer). 
 41 See Calabresi, supra note 40, at 519. 
 42 Escola, 150 P.2d at 441; see also Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 725–
27 (Cal. 1970) (discussing the promotion of safety as justification for strict 
products liability). 
 43 Escola, 150 P.2d at 441. 
 44 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB., supra note 1. 
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specifically in that it extends liability to any party that makes a 
defective product available to the marketplace.45 
The modern strict products liability regime is the legacy of a 
forward-thinking judiciary responding to an evolving marketplace.46 
It took a considerable amount of time — over a century — for tort law 
to evolve to adequately protect consumers from the dangers of 
potentially defective products.47 However, the pinnacle of this 
evolution — the adoption of a strict products liability regime in 
Greenman — should not necessarily represent the conclusion of tort 
law’s adaptation to a changing economy.48 The prevalence of e-
commerce and new business models of increasing complexity and 
connection to the international economy presents a challenge to the 
capability of the strict products liability regime to continue to protect 
consumers as it did in the past. 
III.  OUT-TECHING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
A string of recent cases has tested whether Amazon can be held 
strictly liable for defective products advertised, purchased, and 
distributed through its website and fulfillment services. The judicial 
consensus thus far is that it cannot. However, this conclusion is not 
consistent with the policy goals outlined by Justice Traynor in 
                                                 
 45 Id. § 1 cmt. e (“Liability attaches even when such nonmanufacturing sellers 
or distributors do not themselves render the products defective and regardless of 
whether they are in a position to prevent defects from occurring.”); see also id. 
§ 2 cmt. o (“[S]trict liability is imposed on a wholesale or retail seller who neither 
knew nor should have known of the relevant risks, nor was in a position to have 
taken action to avoid them, so long as a predecessor in the chain of distribution 
could have acted reasonably to avoid the risks.”). 
 46 See G. EDWARD WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF 
LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 247 (Oxford Univ. Press, 3rd ed. 2007) (describing 
Traynor as the “architect” of a progressive, yet controversial, judiciary). 
 47 See Traynor, supra note 30, at 363–65 (noting that Winterbottom, which 
“ignored strict liability, made short shrift of the issue of the manufacturer’s 
negligence, carried the injured plaintiff to the doorstep of privity of contract, and 
left him on the doorstep,” was decided in 1842, and Greenman, which “rejected 
the fiction of warranty in toto, holding the manufacturer to strict liability in tort,” 
was decided 121 years later, in 1963). 
 48 For an overview of prior economic scholarship concerning the ability of the 
American common law to evolve over time, see generally David A. Reese, Does 
the Common Law Evolve?, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 321 (1989). 
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Escola and the evolution of products liability over time. In light of 
an increasingly tech-based society and economy, the judiciary has a 
responsibility to modernize products liability in a way that will 
adequately protect consumers and promote safety in the common 
marketplace. 
A. Amazon’s Distribution Methods for Third-Party Vendors 
Amazon is a multi-billion dollar e-commerce company that 
offers millions of products for sale on its website, Amazon.com.49 
Though some of these products are offered for sale by Amazon 
itself, many are offered for sale by third-party vendors who use 
Amazon’s site to access a wider consumer market.50 By placing their 
products on Amazon’s site, third-party vendors receive access and 
exposure to Amazon’s consumer base, and Amazon benefits by 
expanding the products it offers on its site without the cost of 
investing in additional inventory.51 Before a third-party vendor’s 
product is purchased using the Amazon Marketplace service, it is 
classified as either “Fulfilled by Amazon” (“FBA”), “Fulfilled by 
Merchant” (“FBM”), or “Seller-Fulfilled Prime” (“SFP”), 
depending on how the product will reach the consumer.52 
1. Fulfillment by Amazon 
If a vendor elects to use the FBA service, Amazon catalogs, 
warehouses, packages, ships, and handles customer service 
responsibilities for the vendor’s products.53 The FBA service also 
offers a suite of software services that allows sellers to track sales 
                                                 
 49 See Amazon.com, Inc., 2018 Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 1, 2019). 
 50 Letter from Jeffrey P. Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com, Inc., to its shareholders 
(2017) (on file with author) (“In 2017, for the first time in our history, more than 
half of the units sold on Amazon worldwide were from our third-party sellers, 
including small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs).”); see also Press Release, 
Amazon.com, Inc., Sellers on Amazon are Thriving: Fulfillment by Amazon 
Delivered More than 2 Billion Items for Sellers Worldwide in 2016 (Jan. 4, 2017) 
(on file with author). 
 51 See Reuters, Amazon’s Third-Party Sellers Had Record-Breaking Sales in 
2016, FORTUNE (Jan. 4, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/04/amazon-
marketplace-sales/. 
 52 Fulfillment by Amazon, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2V5FDCG (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2019). 
 53 Id. 
194 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. [VOL. 20: 181 
performance, maintain inventory levels, and launch advertising 
campaigns through Amazon.54 Additionally, Amazon handles 
payment processing by accepting money from buyers and then 
remitting the net cost of the product back to the third-party vendor.55 
In return, Amazon collects extensive fulfillment fees and storage 
fees.56 FBA can be especially attractive to third-party vendors 
because it allows them to pay Amazon to handle basic distribution 
services without the need to make significant capital investments in 
warehousing or supply-chain logistics themselves. 
Perhaps most importantly, though, is that third-party vendors 
using FBA are able to market their products to Amazon’s “Prime” 
members. Prime members pay $12.99 per month (or, for an annual 
subscription, a discounted yearly payment of $119.99) to receive a 
number of benefits from Amazon, including free shipping.57 A 2018 
report estimated Amazon’s Prime membership included 95 million 
people, and that Prime members spend, on average, approximately 
$1,400 per year on merchandise bought through Amazon (compared 
to $600 of yearly spending on the site for the average non-Prime 
customer).58 
                                                 
 54 Fulfillment by Amazon Programs, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2NM5Za1 (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2019). 
 55 How Fulfillment by Amazon Works, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2e1QLLJ (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2019). 
 56 For Amazon’s listing of their FBA fees, see Fulfillment by Amazon (FBA) 
Fees and Rate Structure, AMAZON, https://services.amazon.com/fulfillment-by-
amazon/pricing.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2019). 
 57 Amazon Prime, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2HhMmWr (last visited Mar. 5, 
2019) (illustrating that, in general, Prime members can expect free two-day 
shipping on Prime products, but some Prime members can receive free same-day 
delivery or one-day shipping on certain qualifying orders). 
 58 Amazon Prime Membership Growth Slows, CONSUMER INTEL. RES. 
PARTNERS (July 20, 2018), https://www.cirpllc.com/blog/2018/9/25/amazon-
prime-membership-growth-slows; cf. MICHAEL R. LEVIN & JOSHUA N. LOWITZ, 
CONSUMER INTEL. RESEARCH PARTNERS, AMAZON PRIME HITS 90 MILLION US 
MEMBERS (Oct. 18, 2017) (reporting that the average gap between Prime member 
spending and non-Prime consumer spending on Amazon was roughly $600 in 
2017, which shows that the gap between Prime member spending and non-Prime 
consumer spending widened between 2017 and 2018 by as much as 16 percent, 
while Prime membership increased by approximately 5.5 percent over the same 
period). 
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2. Fulfillment by Merchant 
At the other end of the spectrum — when a product is FBM —
 the third-party vendor is responsible for packing and shipping its 
product to the buyer, and Amazon only handles payment 
processing.59 The obvious drawbacks to FBM are that the third-party 
vendor must store its own inventory, package its own products, pay 
for shipping and handling, and perform customer service 
responsibilities, including product returns and exchanges.60 
However, this could be a beneficial arrangement if the third-party 
vendor can perform these services for itself at a lower cost than 
Amazon’s FBA fees. Additionally, some research suggests that 
third-party vendors choosing FBM distribution are at a marketing 
disadvantage when it comes to the “buy-box.”61 Perhaps the biggest 
disadvantage to third-party vendors that choose FBM is that they are 
not able to market directly to Amazon’s high-spending Prime 
                                                 
 59 John E. Lincoln, Fulfillment by Amazon vs. Fulfillment by Merchant vs. 
Seller-Fulfilled Prime (The Ultimate Guide), IGNITE VISIBILITY, 
https://ignitevisibility.com/fulfillment-amazon-vs-fulfillment-merchant-vs-
seller-fulfilled-prime-ultimate-guide/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019). 
 60 Id. 
 61 The “buy-box” is the area on an Amazon product page that includes the “Add 
to Cart” button and the information surrounding it. When a third-party vendor is 
said to have “won” the buy-box, it means that when a purchaser clicks “Add to 
Cart,” the winning third-party vendor’s product will be automatically placed in 
the purchaser’s cart before other third-party vendors’ products will. All other 
products sold by third-party sellers are grouped into a link that says “[x number] 
new from [$x price],” which leads to a listing of all third-party vendors offering 
that particular product. Competition for the buy-box only occurs where multiple 
third-party vendors offer the same unused product for sale (i.e., “private label 
sellers,” or sellers who are the exclusive sellers of a particular product, 
automatically win the buy-box for their products (with a few exceptions under 
certain circumstances); resellers of such products would have to be sought out by 
purchasers by clicking the “[x number] used from [$x price]” button). Oftentimes, 
the buy-box is simply won by the third-party vendor offering the lowest price, but 
this is not always the case. It is difficult to beat Amazon itself in a competition for 
the buy-box, but it is possible in rare circumstances. For an excellent discussion 
of the algorithm behind winning Amazon’s buy-box, see Le Chen et al., An 
Empirical Analysis of Algorithmic Pricing on Amazon Marketplace, in WWW '16 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 25TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD WIDE WEB 
1339–49 (2016), http://www2016.ca/proceedings.html. 
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members, but sellers can reach those consumers by opting into SFP 
distribution. 
3. Seller-Fulfilled Prime 
SFP combines the all-important access to Amazon’s high-
spending Prime members with the extra control over shipping and 
warehousing costs afforded by FBM.62 While access to Prime 
members could substantially increase revenue for a third-party 
vendor, it must foot the bill for any inventory storage overhead or 
shipping and handling costs; these costs will not be outsourced to 
Amazon like they would be under FBA.63 However, not all third-
party vendors will qualify for SFP, especially because the criteria 
for qualification are extensive.64 For example, third-party vendors 
must first complete a SFP trial period in which they are required to 
process orders with a zero-day handling time.65 Once the trial period 
is complete, they must offer premium shipping options, ship greater 
than 99 percent of their orders on time, have an order cancellation 
rate of less than 0.5 percent, use certain Amazon-approved carriers, 
and still must allow Amazon to handle all customer service 
inquiries.66 
B.  The Implication of Distribution Methods on Amazon’s 
Liability for Defective Products 
Note that in the cases below, FBA is the predominant method by 
which the third-party vendors have placed their products into the 
hands of consumers.67 The exception is Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, 
                                                 
 62 Seller Fulfilled Prime, AMAZON, https://services.amazon.com/services/ 
seller-fulfilled-prime.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2019). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 No case law has emerged regarding defective products fulfilled by SFP, 
though if it had, this recent development might argue that it would be less 
appropriate (though not totally inappropriate) for strict liability to attach to 
Amazon through SFP products than it would be for it to attach to Amazon through 
FBA products. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV.A, V.A, and V.D. This recent 
development does not argue that strict liability should attach to Amazon for 
defective products fulfilled by the FBM method. 
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Inc.,68 where the third-party seller used FBM and assumed 
responsibility for shipping and warehousing the defective product in 
question.69 This factually distinguishes Oberdorf from Allstate,70 
Fox,71 and Eberhart,72 in which the third-party sellers used the FBA 
service.73 The sellers’ use of FBA substantially increased Amazon’s 
role in placing the defective products into consumers’ hands. For 
example, Amazon took charge of warehousing, packing, shipping, 
handling, customer service, and, in some cases, it assumed the 
responsibility to notify purchasers of potentially hazardous defects 
in products sold by third-parties.74 Additionally, the sellers’ use of 
FBA economically benefitted Amazon. For example, in each of the 
cases where the seller utilized FBA, Amazon collected significant 
fees from them for using the FBA service, increased the Prime 
product offerings on its site, and received advertising benefits from 
shipping the defective products in Amazon-branded boxes sealed 
with Amazon-branded tape.75 
1. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc. 
The earliest case in this series is Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc.76 
In Oberdorf, the plaintiff “suffered severe and permanent injuries to 
her left eye when the retractable leash she was using suddenly 
malfunctioned” and “violently” struck her in the face.77 Oberdorf 
purchased the leash on the Amazon Marketplace from a third-party 
                                                 
 68 295 F. Supp. 3d 496 (M.D. Pa. 2017). 
 69 Id. at 498. 
 70 Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197 
(D.N.J. July 24, 2018). 
 71 Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628 (M.D. 
Tenn. May 30, 2018). 
 72 Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 73 See Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *3; Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *2 
(explaining that Amazon disputes that the third-party vendor used FBA, even 
though plaintiff presented evidence that it did; the court did not find this fact 
dispositive nor material in either light); Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 395. 
 74 See, e.g., Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *7. 
 75 See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 76 Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496 (M.D. Pa. 2017). 
 77 Id. at 497. 
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vendor called “The Furry Gang.”78 The Furry Gang opted for the 
FBM method of fulfillment, and Amazon was minimally involved 
in placing the leash on the market.79 As a result, the court granted 
summary judgment in Amazon’s favor, concluding that “[t]he 
Amazon Marketplace serves as a sort of newspaper classified ad 
section, connecting potential consumers with eager sellers in an 
efficient, modern, streamlined manner.”80 The court found that “an 
online sales listing service like Amazon Marketplace” does not 
qualify as a “seller” and thus cannot be held strictly liable for 
product defects.81 The ruling is currently under appeal.82 
Oberdorf is significant because other courts have cited it as 
authority to conclude that Amazon is not strictly liable for defective 
products sold through the FBA service, even though the third-party 
vendor in Oberdorf was highly distinguishable from the other third-
party vendors in Part III because it used the FBM method of 
distribution.83 Further, the ruling of the district court in Oberdorf still 
raises substantial policy questions regarding the ability of injured 
plaintiffs to recover when third-party sellers prove to be 
unreachable.84 This recent development does not argue that Amazon 
                                                 
 78 Id. at 497–98 (also noting that plaintiffs were unable to contact “The Furry 
Gang” or the true manufacturer of the offending leash following the accident). 
 79 Id. at 498. 
 80 Id. at 501. 
 81 Id. (citing Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1989)). 
 82 An online recording of the oral arguments of this appeal can be found at: 
Online audio file: Oral Arguments, Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., CV 18–1041, 
held by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/18-
1041HeatherR.Oberdorf,etal.v.Amazon.Com,Inc.mp3 (on file with author). 
 83 See, e.g., Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018) (“[I]t appears that every court to consider the question of Amazon’s liability 
has concluded that Amazon is not strictly liable for defective products sold on its 
marketplace.”) (citing, inter alia, Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 499–501; Fox v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. 
May 30, 2018); Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 
WL 3546197, at *5–12 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018)); see also Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, 
at *7 (“The Court notes that the conclusion reached here is consistent with that 
reached by other courts addressing the liability of Amazon under other products 
liability statutes.”) (citing Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 496); Allstate, 2018 WL 
3546197, at *10 (finding Oberdorf persuasive, but not controlling). 
 84 See infra notes 163–72 and accompanying text. 
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should be held strictly liable for FBM products; instead, it argues 
that Amazon’s complacency in allowing third-party vendors to 
escape accountability for defective products sold through its online 
marketplace implicates negligence theories of liability and suggests 
a potential need for more effective consumer protection laws.85 
2. Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company v. Amazon.com, 
Inc. 
The second case involves a defective laptop battery that 
plaintiff’s insured (Ms. Wilmot) purchased through the Amazon 
Marketplace from a third-party vendor using the FBA service.86 Ms. 
Wilmot, however, argued that she reasonably believed that Amazon 
was the true seller of the battery because Amazon charged to her 
credit card the purchase price of the battery.87 Additionally, the 
“Prime” designation of the product (allowing Ms. Wilmot to take 
advantage of free expedited shipping) and the branding of the 
packaging in which the battery arrived (an Amazon-branded box 
sealed by Amazon-branded tape) supported the reasonableness of 
her belief.88 While Ms. Wilmot was away, the laptop battery caught 
fire.89 Ms. Wilmot’s house burned down, and though she was able 
to save her dog from the blaze, her cats did not survive.90 “After the 
fire at issue, the Amazon Product Safety Department sent Ms. 
Wilmot an email advising her of a potential fire hazard with the 
laptop battery. Amazon processed a refund for Ms. Wilmot in the 
                                                 
 85 See infra notes 205–26 and accompanying text. 
 86 Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (stating that the 
action was brought on behalf of Ms. Wilmot by her insurance company for claims 
associated with injuries sustained by her which were caused by the defective 
laptop battery). 
 87 Id. (noting that the factual dispute over the reasonableness of Ms. Wilmot’s 
belief that Amazon was the true seller of the laptop battery was immaterial to 
whether or not it should be held strictly liable for the battery) (“While the 
consumer’s subjective belief about the identity of the seller is not determinative, 
there may be instances where Amazon’s interaction with the consumer might 
transform it into a ‘product seller.’”). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at *2. 
 90 Id. 
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form of a gift card and advised her to dispose of ‘the defective 
battery.’”91 Additionally, Amazon’s “A-to-Z Guarantee” states: 
We want you to buy with confidence anytime you make a purchase on 
the Amazon.com website . . . ; that’s why we guarantee purchases from 
third-party sellers when payment is made via the Amazon.com website . 
. . . The condition of the item you buy and its timely delivery are 
guaranteed under the Amazon A-to-Z Guarantee.92 
Despite the extensive involvement Amazon had in the process 
that ultimately led to the defective battery being placed in Ms. 
Wilmot’s possession, including warehousing, marketing, 
transaction handling, branding, shipping, customer service, 
defective product notification, and the provision of guarantees as to 
the safety of products sold on its site, the court here found Amazon 
not strictly liable for the substantial damages caused by the defective 
battery.93 In defending its conclusion, the court stated that Amazon 
is not a “product seller” under the New Jersey Products Liability Act 
(“N.J. PLA”).94 
The N.J. PLA allows a plaintiff to hold the “manufacturer or 
seller” of a defective product strictly liable for his or her injuries 
caused by that defective product.95 The Act defines “product seller” 
as “any [entity] who [in the normal course of business] sells; 
                                                 
 91 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 92 Id. at *3. Ambiguity in Amazon’s A-to-Z guarantee could be reasonably 
construed as an express warranty that a product sold by a third-party vendor will 
not be defective, but this recent development will not explore that possibility. 
 93 Id. at *7–8. 
 94 Id. (holding that Amazon is not a “product seller” in spite of the expansive 
definition of “product seller” under the N.J. PLA) (“By the PLA’s broad language, 
‘any party involved in placing a product in the line of commerce’ can meet the 
definition of a ‘product seller.’ This language is consistent with the principles of 
New Jersey strict products liability law, which hold that, generally, a consumer 
injured by a defective product may bring a strict liability action against any 
business entity in the chain of distribution . . . In that regard, although a distributor 
and a retailer may be innocent conduits in the sale of the defective product, they 
remain liable to the injured party . . . Thus, an entity can be within the chain of 
distribution even without taking possession of the product . . . The absence of the 
original manufacturer or producer does not deprive the injured party of a cause of 
action . . . . Here, Amazon may have technically been a part of the chain of 
distribution, but it never exercised control over the product sufficient to make it a 
‘product seller’ under the PLA.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 95 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (2019). 
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distributes . . . packages; labels; markets; . . . or otherwise is involved 
in placing a product in the line of commerce.”96 It excludes sellers 
of real property, providers of professional services when the essence 
of the transaction is the “furnishing of judgment, skill or services,” 
and persons who act solely in a financial capacity with respect to the 
defective product.97 
The court dispensed with strict liability under the N.J. PLA by 
holding that Amazon never exercised control over the defective 
product.98 Notwithstanding the absence of any control requirement 
in the N.J. PLA, New Jersey courts have maintained this 
requirement, which is rooted in a 1979 products liability case in 
which a New Jersey Appellate Court held that “even when there is 
‘no doubt’ that a party is ‘in the chain of distribution and contributed 
to placing the product in the stream of commerce,’ it, nonetheless, 
‘must be shown that [the party] exercised control over the 
product.’”99 However, this control requirement is a judicial 
invention that was never meant to become a test for whether an 
entity is a seller.100 In the 1979 case, Lyons v. Premo Pharm. Labs, 
Inc.,101 the defendant was a broker, and brokers are already excluded 
from the N.J. PLA.102 Regardless of whether it is actually appropriate 
to use control as a test for whether an entity is a seller, Amazon 
                                                 
 96 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8 (2018); see infra note 106 for the full text of the 
statute. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *7–8. 
 99 Id. (quoting Lyons v. Premo Pharm. Labs, Inc., 406 A.2d 185, 191–92 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), cert. denied, 412 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1979)). 
 100 See Lyons, 406 A.2d at 191–92 (holding that a broker was not strictly liable 
for a defective product because it never “exercised control” over the product) (“It 
is undisputed that [the defendant] never had physical control over the [defective 
product]. It merely arranged the sale; the [product] was shipped directly from [the 
manufacturer] to [the plaintiff].”); see also Scanlon v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
Chevrolet Motor Div., 326 A.2d 673, 678 n.3 (N.J. 1974) (“Proof that a product 
was defective while in the control of the manufacturer also establishes that it was 
defective while in the control of the retailer. However, the converse obviously is 
not true.”). 
 101 406 A.2d 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), cert. denied, 412 A.2d 774 
(N.J. 1979). 
 102 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8 (2018); see infra note 106 for the full text of 
the statute. 
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performed functions that the court in Lyons specifically noted that 
the broker did not perform.103 Amazon performs many functions 
through its FBA service that go beyond “merely arrang[ing] the 
sale.”104 Additionally, Amazon performs multiple roles through 
FBA that are specifically enumerated under the N.J. PLA as roles 
which would classify an entity as a seller.105 By the plain language 
of the statute (i.e., by disregarding the statutorily-absent control 
requirement and considering the plain language of the statute as 
applied to Amazon’s role in fulfilling FBA products), Amazon 
should be held strictly liable for defective FBA products.106 
In any event, a strong argument can still be made that Amazon 
exercised some degree of control over the product. Apart from the 
fact that Amazon was in physical contact with the product while it 
was warehoused at an Amazon facility and when it was being 
packed and shipped to Ms. Wilmot, it also exercised control over 
whether the product was “recommended” to her by its internal 
algorithms.107 For products that are being sold by multiple third-
                                                 
 103 Lyons, 406 A.2d at 191–92. 
 104 Id.; see also Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., 762 A.2d 311, 320 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2000) (holding that courts should look to whether the defendant’s 
role “was that of a facilitator rather than an ‘active participant’ in the transaction,” 
with particular focus on whether the defendant “[ever] had physical control of the 
product [or] had merely arranged the sale”); see Fulfillment by Amazon Programs, 
supra note 54. 
 105 See Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 
3546197, at *7 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (specifically, Amazon distributed, 
packaged, labeled, marketed, and otherwise was involved in the placing of the 
defective product in the line of commerce); see also supra notes 95–96 and 
accompanying text. 
 106 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8 (2018) (“‘Product seller’ means any person 
who, in the course of a business conducted for that purpose: sells; distributes; 
leases; installs; prepares or assembles a manufacturer’s product according to the 
manufacturer’s plan, intention, design, specifications or formulations; blends; 
packages; labels; markets; repairs; maintains or otherwise is involved in placing 
a product in the line of commerce. The term ‘product seller’ does not include: (1) 
A seller of real property; or (2) A provider of professional services in any case in 
which the sale or use of a product is incidental to the transaction and the essence 
of the transaction is the furnishing of judgment, skill or services; or (3) Any person 
who acts in only a financial capacity with respect to the sale of a product.”). 
 107 For an in-depth discussion of Amazon’s recommender system, called item-
based collaborative filtering, see generally Brent Smith & Greg Linden, Two 
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party vendors, Amazon also uses an internal algorithm to determine 
who will win the buy-box; i.e., its algorithms determine from which 
entity a consumer will purchase a particular item when they click 
“add to cart.”108 This dual-control over what a consumer is exposed 
to is analogous to a shop-owner rotating his stock so that his 
customers only see the products he wants them to buy, pushing the 
rest to the back of the shelf. The algorithmic control over product 
visibility, combined with its physical control over the defective 
laptop battery during certain stages of the distribution process, is 
representative of a degree of overall control that should place 
Amazon squarely within the “control” requirement described by the 
Allstate court, qualifying it as a seller subject to strict liability under 
the N.J. PLA. 
3. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc. 
In the next case, Fox, the eponymous plaintiff used Amazon to 
purchase a hoverboard for her son as a Christmas gift in late 2015.109 
As in Oberdorf and Allstate, the plaintiff purchased the product 
through the Amazon Marketplace from a third-party vendor 
allegedly using the FBA service.110 Amazon charged the entire 
amount of the hoverboard to the plaintiff’s credit card, and the 
receipt was sent to the plaintiff by Amazon.111 When the product 
arrived, it was in an Amazon-branded box sealed by Amazon-
branded tape.112 The box containing the product displayed no 
information about the third-party seller or the manufacturer of the 
product.113 A few weeks after Christmas, the hoverboard caused a 
                                                 
Decades of Recommender Systems at Amazon.com, 21 IEEE INTERNET 
COMPUTING 12 (2017). 
 108 See Chen et al., supra note 61. 
 109 Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *1 
(M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018). 
 110 Id. at *2 (Amazon disputes that the third-party vendor used FBA, but 
plaintiff presented evidence that it did, specifically that the box the hoverboard 
arrived in “contained the trademark ‘Amazon’ on the outside.” The court did not 
find this fact dispositive nor material in either light.). 
 111 Id. (noting that, had Fox requested a refund, it would have been processed 
through and paid by Amazon). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
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fire that destroyed the plaintiff’s home and caused physical and 
psychological injuries to her and her family.114 
Unlike Oberdorf and Allstate, Amazon was directly aware of the 
safety risks posed by the hoverboard in question.115 On November 
30, 2015, in the midst of a three-month investigation into the safety 
of hoverboards purchased on the Amazon website, Amazon CEO 
Jeff Bezos received an email informing him of a hoverboard, 
purchased from the same third-party vendor that Fox purchased 
from, that “burst into flames” with “fireworks-like explosions.”116 A 
December 10, 2015 report written by the safety team overseeing the 
investigation “identified at least 17 complaints of hoverboard fires 
or explosions in the United States alone from hoverboards sold on 
Amazon’s website.”117 The leader of the safety team felt that all 
hoverboards being sold on the Amazon site were potentially 
dangerous because the risk of “fires and explosions were spread 
across many manufacturers, many brands, and many component 
parts.”118 In describing Amazon’s reaction to the safety team’s 
report, the court wrote: 
Amazon decided to recommend the international sales team suspend all 
hoverboard sales. During that meeting, Amazon also decided to send a 
“non-alarmist” email to United States hoverboard purchasers. After 
being told of the decision to suspend all hoverboard sales worldwide, the 
third highest Amazon executive sent an email on December 10, 2015, 
cautioning other Amazon employees that the email to customers would 
be “headline news.” [The email stated “There have been news reports of 
safety issues involving products like the one you purchased that contain 
rechargeable lithium-ion batteries.”] Amazon stopped selling 
hoverboards in the United States and worldwide starting on December 
11, 2015.119 
Again, as in Allstate, the court here ruled that Amazon was not 
strictly liable for defective products sold through its Marketplace 
and delivered using its FBA service.120 Though the Tennessee 
                                                 
 114 Id. at *1. 
 115 Id. at *4. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at *4–5 (internal citations omitted). 
 120 Id. at *7. 
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Products Liability Act, like the N.J. PLA, requires strict liability for 
sellers and distributors of defective products, the court held that 
Amazon was neither a seller nor a distributor.121 However, in 
summarizing the policy arguments made by the plaintiff to extend 
strict liability to Amazon, the court noted that “[a]lthough one might 
agree these policy implications justify extending liability to 
businesses like Amazon, that decision is for the Tennessee 
legislature as it would require, in the Court’s view, an expansion of 
the Act’s current definition of ‘seller.’”122 
4. Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc. 
The most recent products liability suit brought against Amazon, 
Eberhart, follows a fact pattern similar to Allstate and Fox. The 
plaintiff in Eberhart ordered a French press coffeemaker that was 
displayed for sale by a third-party vender on Amazon’s website 
using the FBA service.123 He alleged that while washing the 
coffeepot, which was labeled as the “CoffeeGet 6 cup 27 oz. French 
Press Coffee Maker with thick heat resistant glass,” the glass 
shattered and caused significant lacerations to his hand, resulting in 
permanent nerve damage.124 Although the third-party vendor paid 
Amazon to warehouse and deliver its products through FBA 
services, the court noted that Amazon never took title of the 
coffeemaker, nor did it write, edit, or substantively review the 
information contained on the product detail page it hosted on its 
website.125 
                                                 
 121 Id. at *6 (holding that Amazon was not a seller because it never took title to 
the hoverboard, notwithstanding the absence of any title requirement in statute, 
precedent, or persuasive authority); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) 
(“‘Seller’ includes a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor, and means any individual 
or entity engaged in the business of selling a product whether such sale is for 
resale, or for use or consumption.”). 
 122 Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *8 n.4 (“To the extent Plaintiffs suggest the court 
should apply the spirit of the law rather than the actual text, the Court declines to 
do so.”). 
 123 Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 124 Id.; see also Coffeeget 6 Cup 27 Oz French Press Coffee Maker with Thick 
Heat Resistant Glass by coffeeGet: Kitchen and Dining, AMAZON, 
https://amzn.to/2CNSPoI (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (showing that the product is 
no longer available through Amazon). 
 125 Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 395–96. 
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The law in New York, as in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and 
Tennessee, is that a “manufacturer of defective products . . . may be 
held strictly liable for injuries caused by its products, regardless of 
privity, foreseeability, or due care,” and that strict liability is also 
extended to “certain sellers, such as retailers and distributors.”126 
Although the court in Eberhart cited a New York case that identified 
the lack of a concrete definition for “distributor” as it applies to strict 
products liability, it ruled that “the failure to take title to a product 
places an entity on the outside [of the chain of distribution].”127 The 
court acknowledged that the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability does not include a title requirement, but dismissed this 
complication by stating that “the Restatement excludes ‘product 
distribution facilitators’ . . .  — such as advertisers, sales personnel, 
and auctioneers — from the definition of distributors.”128 Amazon’s 
relationship to the distribution of the coffeemaker, however, goes 
far beyond the exclusions in the Restatement, and the Eberhart 
court’s reliance on a title requirement is misplaced. The misapplied 
legal foundations in the cases above are merely the disturbing 
fountainhead to the eventual erosion of the strict products liability 
regime in the modern economy. 
IV.  LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The courts in Eberhart, Fox, and Allstate may have 
overgeneralized the implications of the ruling in Oberdorf and relied 
on it too much in the absence of other case law directly dealing with 
Amazon’s potential liability for defective products. However, there 
are significant and material factual differences between Amazon’s 
                                                 
 126 Id. at 397 (citing Finerty v. Abex Corp., 51 N.E.3d 555 (2016), and Sukljian 
v. Charles Ross & Son Co., 503 N.E.2d 1358 (1986)). 
 127 Id. at 398 (citing McCormack v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., No. 110733/10, 
2011 WL 1643590, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 5, 2011) (“Neither of the parties has 
provided the court with a New York definition of ‘distributor’ as it applies to strict 
products liability, and the court could not find a statute or case on point.”). But 
see Brumbaugh v. CEJJ, Inc., 152 A.D.2d 69, 70–72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) 
(holding that a manufacturer’s “exclusive marketing agent” was strictly liable for 
injuries caused by a defective product, even though the agent had never taken 
“actual possession, title, or control”). 
 128 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 20 cmt. g (AM. 
LAW INST. 1998)). 
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role in the distribution of the defective dog leash in Oberdorf and its 
role in the distribution of products it fulfills through the FBA 
service.129 Chiefly, the courts in Eberhart, Fox, and Allstate 
understated Amazon’s involvement in placing defective products on 
the consumer market. They also problematically fixated on the idea 
that Amazon must have taken title to the defective product in order 
to be found strictly liable for injuries resulting from it. 
A.  Amazon: Merely an Online Marketplace? 
The most troublesome mistake that the courts in Allstate, Fox, 
and Eberhart made when analyzing Amazon’s potential liability is 
that they all cited to Oberdorf to support the assertion that Amazon 
is merely an online marketplace, playing a role analogous to that of 
a flea market, auctioneer, broker, or newspaper classified-ads 
section.130 Although these analogies are more accurate based on the 
facts in Oberdorf because the third-party vendor in that case used 
FBM, they do not translate as smoothly onto the facts of the other 
three cases in which third-party vendors utilized FBA. 
The court in Oberdorf accurately pointed out that Amazon is 
more akin to an auctioneer, or to a newspaper’s classified-ads 
section, in its potential liability for the defective dog leash sold and 
fulfilled by a third-party vendor on its site.131 However, it is 
unmistakable that Amazon’s direct involvement in the introduction 
of FBA products into the common marketplace is far greater than 
the examples the court alludes to in Oberdorf.132 In Oberdorf, 
Amazon had no physical interaction with the defective dog leash, 
and its role did not extend far beyond the provision of a platform for 
the third-party vendor, “The Furry Gang,” to list its product to 
potential buyers and facilitate payment by the purchaser to The 
                                                 
 129 See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text. 
 130 Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197, 
at *10 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018); Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 
2018 WL 2431628, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018); Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d 
at 399. 
 131 Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 501 (M.D. Pa. 2017). 
 132 See discussion supra Part III.A for an analysis of the major differences in 
distribution methods available to third-party sellers. 
208 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. [VOL. 20: 181 
Furry Gang.133 This is highly analogous to the service provided by 
Craigslist or a traditional newspaper classified ads section. 
However, it would be a grievous error to treat this analysis of 
Amazon’s role in FBM transactions as a blanket generalization 
applicable to Amazon’s role in SFP or FBA transactions. Clearly, 
Amazon is more involved in, and receives more benefit from, 
directly facilitating the distribution of FBA products.134 There are 
also general distinctions between Amazon and other online 
auctioneers or classified ads sites that transcend commonly-used 
distribution methods. When its interface is compared to other 
online-auctioneers, Amazon is clearly distinguishable. For example, 
eBay is much more similar to an auctioneer because it requires 
interactivity on the part of buyers placing active bids.135 
Additionally, the “seller information” is prominently located next to 
the bidding area in eBay’s user interface. Amazon, on the other 
hand, only displays “Sold by [Seller] and Fulfilled by Amazon” in 
small-type under the area indicating whether the item is in stock or 
not, buried in an information-dense area of the user-interface called 
the “buy-box.”136 Similarly, when compared to online classified ad 
services, such as Craigslist, Amazon is again clearly 
distinguishable.137 Although seller information is not directly 
                                                 
 133 Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 501. 
 134 For instance, Amazon collects fees from third-party vendors to warehouse, 
catalog, ship, pack, handle, and facilitate payment services and customer service 
responsibilities. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 135 See Inman v. Technicolor USA, Inc., No. 11-666, 2011 WL 5829024, at *5–
6 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2011) (holding that eBay is not strictly liable for defective 
products because it is not a “seller”). There are some items on eBay where bids 
are not necessary in order to purchase them; however, eBay is most similar to an 
auctioneer when it facilitates bids on behalf of sellers. 
 136 See generally Le Chen et al., supra note 61 (offering an economic analysis 
of the “buy-box”). 
 137 See McDonald v. LG Elecs. USA, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 533, 536 (D. Md. 
2016) (holding that Amazon was distinguishable from Craigslist because Amazon 
does not have immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 230 for defective products sold on its 
website, because although § 230 “would immunize Amazon from liability for 
‘objectionable written content’ . . . § 230 does not state anything about protecting 
websites that sell, and profit from the sale of, defective products”) (citations 
omitted); cf. Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735(RMB), 2009 WL 
1704355, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (holding that Craigslist is immunized by 
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available through Craigslist, the means to directly contact the seller 
are available, unlike on Amazon where customer service requests 
and inquiries go through Amazon customer support. The essential 
role played by the Facebook Marketplace is merely to facilitate 
contact between buyer and seller, and the seller’s information is 
more openly available to purchasers than on Craigslist. 
Additionally, the nonprofessional listings on Craigslist and 
Facebook make clear that Craigslist and Facebook themselves are 
not the seller, whereas Amazon branding is abundant throughout the 
Amazon site.138 
Apart from these general distinctions, the fact remains that 
Amazon is not merely an online company or product-listing 
platform.139 Its physical reach is extensive — it owns or leases more 
than 250 million square feet of space, including space for 
warehousing, fulfillment centers, and physical stores.140 Statistics 
from the United States Department of Commerce show that e-
commerce represented thirteen percent of total retail sales in the 
United States, and Amazon alone accounted for nearly half of e-
                                                 
47 U.S.C. § 230 in a defective warning products liability suit, because “[t]he 
alleged handgun advertisement identified in the [Amended] Complaint was 
provided by another information content provider, not Craigslist”; and “the 
[Amended] Complaint on its face improperly seeks to treat Craigslist as the 
publisher or speaker of the alleged advertisement”). 
 138 See infra note 189. 
 139 See generally Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 
710 (2017) (illustrating that Amazon is more than just an online marketplace by 
describing its business activities, conduct, and structure from an antitrust 
perspective). 
 140 Amazon.com, Inc., 2017 Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 16 (Jan. 24, 2018); 
see also Esther Fung, Amazon to Shut All U.S. Pop-Up Stores as It Rethinks 
Physical Retail Strategy, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://on.wsj.com/2WFVJU3 (subscription required) (reporting that Amazon is 
set to open additional locations of physical Amazon bookstores and “four star 
stores”); Esther Fung & Heather Haddon, Amazon to Launch New Grocery-Store 
Business, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://on.wsj.com/2GSfkwG (subscription 
required) (“Amazon.com, Inc. is planning to open dozens of grocery stores in 
several major U.S. cities . . . .”); Heather Haddon & Laura Stevens, Amazon Tests 
Its Cashierless Technology for Bigger Stores, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2018), 
https://on.wsj.com/2Q5TACm (subscription required) (reporting that Amazon is 
considering expanding “cashierless” transaction capability in physical retail 
locations). 
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commerce sales.141 Furthermore, Amazon is increasingly involved 
in the delivery of products, taking on the role of a common carrier 
in some instances.142 In fact, it listed “companies that provide 
fulfillment and logistics services” as competitors on its 2018 annual 
report.143 In 2019, Amazon made significant investments in 
expanding last-mile delivery services as well as its Prime Air 
delivery system.144 Currently, Amazon is developing its drone 
delivery capabilities, and CEO Jeff Bezos predicted that such a 
delivery method could be commonplace as soon as 2022.145 
                                                 
 141 Fareeha Ali, U.S. Ecommerce Sales Grow 15.0% in 2018, DIGITAL COM. 
360 (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/article/us-
ecommerce-sales/ (reporting that Amazon was responsible for 40 percent of U.S. 
e-commerce sales and 43.3 percent of U.S. e-commerce gains in 2017); Jack Nicas 
& Laura Stevens, Wal-Mart and Google Team Up to Challenge Amazon, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://on.wsj.com/2xsh4DQ (subscription required); 
Patrick Sisson, 9 Facts About Amazon’s Unprecedented Warehouse Empire, 
CURBED (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.curbed.com/2017/11/21/16686150/black-
friday-2018-amazon-warehouse-fulfillment. 
 142 See, e.g., James Chrisman, Amazon Can Now Deliver All Your Packages on 
the Same Day, THRILLIST (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.thrillist.com/news 
/nation/amazon-day-feature-packages-delivered-same-time (showing Amazon’s 
increasing role in the logistics of product delivery); James Vincent, Amazon has 
Made its Own Autonomous Six-Wheeled Delivery Robot, VERGE (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/ 2019/1/23/18194566/amazon-scout-autonomous-six-
wheeled-delivery-robot (showing Amazon’s emphasis on beginning to deliver 
products itself); Elizabeth Weise & Mike Snider, Amazon is Testing its Own 
Delivery Service. If it Succeeds, Expect a Price War, USA TODAY (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/02/09/amazon-reportedly-
developing-delivery-service-compete-fedex-and-ups/322725002/ (discussing an 
Amazon pilot program that would pick up FBA products from sellers and deliver 
them to Amazon fulfillment centers for warehousing until they are sold). 
 143 Amazon.com, Inc., 2018 Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 1, 2019). 
 144 Adam Levy, Amazon is Looking More and More Like a Shipping Company, 
MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 19, 2019, 9:32 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing 
/2019/02/19/amazon-is-looking-more-and-more-like-a-shipping-co.aspx (“The 
company’s recent efforts to grow its fleet of cargo planes, expand its network of 
air hubs, and boost its investments in solving the last-mile delivery problem are a 
big indication that it’s not just looking to supplement FedEx and UPS capacity 
anymore . . . . Amazon is starting to consider itself a shipping business.”). 
 145 David Streitfeld, Amazon Is Now Second to Cross $1 Trillion Line, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2018, at B1. 
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The lasting applicability of old-media comparisons or pre-
internet age analogies is tenuous; the integration of the modern 
economy with internet services and e-commerce websites is 
continuous and unlikely to regress.146 It is important that courts not 
parse language to cleave a large and growing section of the economy 
out of the American strict products liability regime. Exempting e-
commerce entities from this regime, while still imposing it on other 
entities with comparable roles in the distribution of potentially 
defective products, raises substantial horizontal equity concerns that 
could have drastic long-term consequences. 
B.  The Improper Fixation on “Title” in Eberhart, Fox, and 
Allstate 
The rulings in Eberhart and Fox are predicated on the theory 
that non-assumption of title of a defective product insulates an entity 
that would otherwise be considered a distributor, seller, or retailer 
from strict liability.147 However, this is a misguided application of 
the law.148 Any requirement for a retailer or distributor to hold title 
in a defective product in order for it to be subject to strict liability is 
absent from products liability statutes, from the Restatement and 
from relevant case law.149 
                                                 
 146 For a discussion of the future of e-commerce with respect to 5G technology, 
see Nir Kshetri, 5G in E-Commerce Activities, IT PROF., July–Aug. 2018, at 73. 
For a general discussion of the importance of e-commerce to the success of small- 
and medium-sized enterprises, see generally Qingyi Chen & Ning Zhang, Does 
E-Commerce Provide a Sustained Competitive Advantage? An Investigation of 
Survival and Sustainability in Growth-Oriented Enterprises, 7 SUSTAINABILITY 
1411 (2015). 
 147 See Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018); Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6 
(M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018). 
 148 See Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 498 (M.D. Pa. 
2017) (noting specifically the distinction between the distribution method in 
Oberdorf and the FBA service) (“Unless the third-party vendor participates in a 
special ‘Fulfillment by Amazon’ program (which was not the case here), Amazon 
has no interaction with the third-party vendor’s product at any time.”). 
 149 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8 (2018) (see supra note 106 for the 
full text of the statute); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) (2018) (see supra note 
121 for the relevant text of the statute); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. 
LIAB., supra note 1; see also Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 
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The Eberhart court defended the title requirement on the 
grounds that the “vast majority of opinions” in New York refer to 
distributors only in the context of an entity who in-fact sold the 
defective product.150 The problem with this defense is that simply 
because there have only been opinions holding distributors who 
have taken title to a defective product strictly liable, the definition 
of distributor does not necessarily preclude entities that have not 
taken title. In fact, the plain language of the Restatement and 
precedent in other jurisdictions supports the assertion that 
distributors do include entities that have not taken title.151 
In Fox, Amazon argued that it was not a “seller” under Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 29-28-102(7) because it never took title to the defective 
hoverboard.152 The court did not necessarily find the lack of title 
                                                 
320–21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (holding that “neither the transfer of title to the goods 
nor a sale is required” for the application of the doctrine of strict liability); 
Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 186–87 (N.J. 1982) 
(“[Courts] have clearly rejected the requirement that a technical sale occur before 
strict liability will be imposed.”) (citing Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental 
Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 778–79 (N.J. 1965)); cf. Gray Line Co. v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 280 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1960) (holding a tire company, which never 
transferred title to the defective tire, liable to the plaintiff bus company for injuries 
resulting from use of the tire); Greyhound Corp. v. Brown, 113 So.2d 916 (Ala. 
1959) (holding a tire company, which never transferred title to the defective tire, 
liable to the plaintiff bus company for injuries resulting from use of the tire); 
Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (holding a 
lessor liable for injuries resulting from a defective product it leased to the 
plaintiff’s employer); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 792 
(Tex. 1967) (holding that a formal sale is not required to impose strict liability) 
(“One who delivers an advertising sample to another with the expectation of 
profiting therefrom through future sales is in the same position as one who sells 
the product.”). 
 150 Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 398–400 (citing McCormack v. Safety-Kleen 
Systems, Inc., No. 110733/10, 2011 WL 1643590, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 5, 
2011) (holding that the defendant was not strictly liable because it was more 
accurately classified as a common-carrier of the defective product than as a 
distributor)). 
 151 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB., supra note 1; see also Barth, 
71 Cal. Rptr. at 320 (“Neither the transfer of title to the goods nor a sale is 
required” for the application of the doctrine of strict liability). 
 152 Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *7 
(M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) (2018) 
(see supra note 121 for the relevant text of the statute). 
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dispositive, but in conjunction with the court’s finding that Amazon 
did not set the price of the hoverboard nor write the product 
description displayed on the product page, the court declined to label 
Amazon a “seller” for Tennessee PLA purposes.153 However, like in 
Eberhart, the court cites no authority which requires assumption of 
title for the imposition of strict liability.154 A close review of 
statutory language and citations to the Tennessee PLA reveals no 
authority that mentions a title requirement.155 
In Allstate, the court dispensed with the notion that Amazon was 
a “product seller” under the N.J. PLA because it never exercised 
control over the defective product.156 It noted that title is a highly 
significant factor in the determination of whether a seller exercised 
control; though the factor is not dispositive, if an entity takes title of 
a defective product, it is more likely that it exercised some control 
over the product.157 The logic in the Allstate court’s opinion is 
fallacious for the same reason that it is fallacious in Eberhart: taking 
title may substantially inflate the likelihood that an entity exercised 
                                                 
 153 Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *7; see also infra notes 194–96 and 
accompanying text (discussing why Amazon did, at least to some extent, set the 
price of the hoverboard). 
 154 See Fox, 2018 WL 2431628. 
 155 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102. 
 156 See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text. This recent development 
argues that Amazon actually did exert sufficient control over the defective product 
in Allstate to be subject to strict liability under the N.J. PLA, given its extensive 
physical and algorithmic control over the battery (even though the court’s 
requirement that Amazon must have had control over the product to be subject to 
strict liability was erroneous from the outset). 
 157 See, e.g., Straley v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 728 (D.N.J. 1995) (applying 
New Jersey law) (holding that an entity that actually took title to a truck before 
selling it was a “seller” within the meaning of New Jersey products liability law); 
Agurto v. Guhr, 887 A.2d 159, 163 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (“Strict 
liability may also apply to a broker who takes possession of goods, or exercises 
control over them, and then transfers them to a buyer.”). But see Laidlow v. 
Hariton Mach. Co., 762 A.2d 311, 321 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (holding 
that a broker who did take title to the defective product was not strictly liable for 
injuries resulting from it). 
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control, but it does not imply that a failure to take title exonerates an 
entity from strict products liability.158 
This outsized fixation on a requirement that an entity must have 
held title to a defective product before it can be held liable for 
injuries resulting from the product is improper given prior case law 
which distinguishes title as merely one factor among many in 
determining whether strict liability is appropriate.159 The most 
appropriate legal conclusion, based on the facts, is that Amazon 
should be held strictly liable for third-party products fulfilled 
through its FBA service, given Amazon’s extensive and inextricable 
role in directly facilitating the distribution of defective products.160 
This problematic misinterpretation of the law behind strict products 
liability is a troubling preamble to the judicial indifference toward 
its policy underpinnings. 
V.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The holdings in the four Amazon cases described in Part III 
understate the importance of the larger policy goals of tort law and 
mark a resistance to the natural evolution of tort law in tandem with 
the evolution of a modernizing economy.161 The policy shift that 
started with MacPherson and Escola was a response to the changing 
                                                 
 158 See Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 186–87 (N.J. 
1982) (noting that New Jersey courts “have clearly rejected the requirement that 
a technical sale occur before strict liability will be imposed”); see also Ketterer v. 
Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912) (“The remedies of injured 
consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of 
sales.”). 
 159 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 160 See, e.g., Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 
3546197, at *7 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (illustrating that, specifically, even though 
it did not actually take title of the defective laptop battery, Amazon distributed, 
packaged, labeled, marketed, and otherwise was involved in the placing of the 
battery in the line of commerce); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8(7) (2018) (see 
supra note 106 for the full text of the statute). 
 161 For a discussion of the evolution of tort law as a response to a modernizing 
economy, see generally Cornelius J. Peck, Negligence and Liability without Fault 
in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 225, 240 (1971) (“[Strict liability] is a principle 
with adaptability to serve the needs of society in a variety of situations.”); see also 
John W. Wade, The Continuing Development of Strict Liability in Tort, 22 ARK. 
L. REV. 233 (1968). 
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economy of the twentieth century.162 Here, with Eberhart and its 
predecessors, courts have failed to recognize the outsize role of e-
commerce and online retail in the modern economy, as well as 
Amazon’s specific role in placing potentially defective products into 
the marketplace and thus into contact with consumers. 
A. Incentivizing a Safer Marketplace for Consumers 
One of the most common rationales given for strict products 
liability is that it tends to promote product safety.163 The actual 
efficacy of the strict products liability regime to incentivize product 
safety is debatable, at best.164 There are some industries, such as 
automobile manufacturing, where there is at least some correlation 
between the imposition of a more stringent products liability regime 
and increased safety in those products over time.165 Notwithstanding 
the apparent lack of empirical evidence to support or refute strict 
                                                 
 162 Peck, supra note 161, at 240 (“Problems of proof in suits against 
manufacturers for harm done by defective products became more severe as the 
composition and design of products and the techniques of manufacture became 
less and less matters of common experience; this was certainly a factor bringing 
about adoption of a strict liability standard.”). 
 163 See, e.g., Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391 (Wisc. 1979) (“Strict 
liability is an effective deterrent; it deters the creation of unnecessary risks, or to 
put it positively, strict liability is an incentive to safety.”); Harry Kalven, Jr., Tort 
Watch, 34 J. AM. TRIAL L. ASS’N 1, 57 (1972) (“The first characteristic is thought 
to make him a good target for the deterrence of the tort sanction. Liability is 
imposed in the quest for safety and accident prevention . . . .”). 
 164 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for 
Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1436 (2010) (arguing that market forces and 
government regulation are at least as likely to cause increasing product safety as 
strict products liability). Compare George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer 
Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981) (arguing that consumers are often 
the most efficiently situated to insure against defective products), with William C. 
Whitford, Comment on A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 91 YALE 
L.J. 1371 (1982) (finding fault in the methodology of the former’s analysis). 
 165 W. Kip Viscusi, Does Product Liability Make Us Safer?, 35 REG., Spring 
2012, at 24, 26–27 (showing that safety has increased significantly in automobile 
manufacture since the ruling in MacPherson, but insurance costs remain relatively 
high). But see Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 164. It is true that there are myriad 
other variables that could affect increased safety in automobiles, such as 
technological advances, government regulation, and increased consumer pressure 
to produce safer vehicles. Nevertheless, products liability provides at least 
symbolic, if not economic, incentive to increase product safety. 
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products liability’s efficacy as a deterrent force, the incentivization 
of a safer consumer marketplace is nonetheless one of the most 
important justifications given in support of the regime as well as the 
justification most closely aligned with the overarching deterrent 
goal of tort law generally.166 
To that end, Amazon is possibly better situated to efficiently 
incentivize a safer internet marketplace than any other entity in the 
modern e-commerce ecosystem. Amazon has already shown 
promise in this area with its “ASBSA,” or “Amazon Services 
Business Solutions Agreement.”167 The ASBSA currently provides 
an encouraging framework for ensuring that third-party vendors can 
be held accountable to Amazon’s shoppers. For instance, it already 
requires that third party vendors indemnify Amazon in the event of 
a suit resulting from one of the third-party vendors’ products.168 It 
also requires third-party vendors to promise Amazon that they are a 
duly and legally organized business and that all information 
regarding the seller is true and accurate.169 Unfortunately, the reality 
is that the ASBSA exists primarily to serve Amazon’s interest in 
shielding itself from as much liability stemming from its third-party 
vendors as possible.170 Not only that, but the ASBSA is only roughly 
enforced to ensure that third-party vendors are legally reachable by 
Amazon and its customers.171 
Going forward, consumers would benefit along with Amazon if 
it commits to effectively strengthening and enforcing its ASBSA 
terms to ensure the reachability of its third-party vendors. 
Additionally, Amazon possesses a great deal of leverage with which 
it could exert more pressure on its third-party vendors to verify the 
quality and legitimacy of the products they sell on Amazon. With 
                                                 
 166 See generally Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 
181 (2011); Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 
52 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1093 (1993) (stating that a “central goal [of tort law] is to 
reduce accident costs by deterring the creation of risks”). 
 167 Amazon Services Business Solutions Agreement, AMAZON, 
https://amzn.to/2FKJRcB (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
 168 Id. at ¶ 6. 
 169 Id. at ¶ 5. 
 170 Id. at ¶¶ 5–8. 
 171 See discussion infra Part V.D.1. 
MAY 2019] Out-Teching Products Liability 217 
any luck, Amazon’s influence would significantly hinder the sale of 
dangerous counterfeit products such as the one that burned down the 
Foxes’ home.172 Instead of placing profit above safety concerns, 
Amazon should increase its oversight authority to ensure that third-
party vendors comply with the ASBSA and any additional measures 
necessary to ensure that they are held accountable in case of a 
defective product. 
B.  Profit and Benefit: Social Responsibility 
Justice Traynor emphasized the social importance of placing 
losses from defective products with the parties responsible for 
placing those products on the market.173 With the notable exception 
of Oberdorf, Amazon played an intimate role in the overall 
distribution of the defective FBA products in Part III.174 The 
Restatement extends strict liability for defective products to all 
“nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors” of those products.175 The 
Restatement specifically exempts “product distribution 
facilitators” — those who “indirectly [facilitate] the commercial 
distribution of products” — from strict liability.176 It cites advertising 
firms, financing companies, auctioneers, and sales representatives 
as examples of the type of “[indirect] distribution facilitators” that 
are exempt from strict liability.177 However, Amazon is clearly 
distinguishable from the type of entity that the Restatement exempts 
as “[indirect] distribution facilitators,” and holding Amazon strictly 
                                                 
 172 Counterfeit products are a relatively common — and dangerous —
 occurrence on Amazon. See, e.g., Complaint for Damages and Equitable Relief, 
at 3–4, Apple, Inc., v. Mobile Star, LLC, 3:16–CV–06001 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 
2016),  2016 WL 6110683 (alleging Mobile Star supplied counterfeit Apple 
products for sale on Amazon) (“Consumers, relying on Amazon.com’s reputation, 
have no reason to suspect the . . . products they purchased from Amazon.com are 
anything but genuine.”). 
 173 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) 
(Traynor, J., concurring) (“[If defective products enter the market] it is to the 
public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon 
the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the 
product, is responsible for its reaching the market.”). 
 174 See supra notes 49–75 and accompanying text. 
 175 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB., supra note 1, at cmt. e. 
 176 Id. § 20 cmt g. 
 177 Id. § 20 reporters’ n. g. 
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liable more closely aligns with prior case law holding similar 
nonmanufacturing retailers and distributors strictly liable.178 
Before 1998, when the products liability Restatement was last 
revised, Amazon had been a public company for less than a year and 
sold only books.179 Its Amazon Prime service wasn’t launched until 
2005, and its FBA service wasn’t launched until 2006.180 Amazon, 
even today, defies traditional notions of what a “distributor” might 
look like.181 However, Amazon plays an integral role in placing 
potentially dangerous products into consumers’ hands, which is a 
principal justification for imposing strict liability.182 The California 
Court of Appeals in Kasel v. Remington Arms Co.183 explained this 
                                                 
 178 See generally Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 247 N.E.2d 401, 
408 (Ill. 1969) (holding a wholesaler liable for a defective hammer even though 
the hammer merely passed unopened through the wholesaler’s warehouse); see 
also Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (Ct. App. 1965) (holding 
a wholesaler powder company strictly liable even though it never had possession 
of the product and merely placed an order with the manufacturer, who shipped the 
defective product directly to the customer); Little v. Maxim, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 
875, 877 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (holding a distributor strictly liable even though it had 
the defective product shipped directly to its customer and took no part in its 
installation); Kirby v. Rouselle Corp., 108 Misc. 2d 291, 293 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1981) (holding that a distributor is strictly liable even though it never inspects, 
controls, installs, or services the defective product). 
 179 BRAD STONE, THE EVERYTHING STORE: JEFF BEZOS AND THE AGE OF 
AMAZON (Little Brown & Co., 2013) (noting that Amazon’s IPO was a “moderate 
success”). 
 180 See id.; Press Release, Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon Launches New Services 
to Help Small and Medium-Sized Businesses Enhance Their Customer Offerings 
by Accessing Amazon’s Order Fulfillment, Customer Service, and Website 
Functionality (Sept. 19, 2006) (https://press.aboutamazon.com/news-
releases/news-release-details/amazon-launches-new-services-help-small-and-
medium-sized). 
 181 See supra notes 130–46 and accompanying text. 
 182 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 
1963) (noting that liability attaches when a defective product is “placed on the 
market”); see also Frank J. Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort Liability of Retailers, 
Wholesalers, and Distributors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA L. REV. 213, 221 
(1987) (“Thus, although not responsible for the manufacture and production of 
the product, retailers, wholesalers, and distributors occupy a position in, and 
derive benefits from, the marketing chain, which is sufficient to impose strict tort 
liability.”). 
 183 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). 
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imposition by stating that “[i]t is the defendant’s participatory 
connection, for his personal profit or other benefit, with the injury-
producing product and with the enterprise which created consumer 
demand for and reliance upon the product which calls for imposition 
of strict liability.”184 The “personal profit or other benefit” discussed 
in Kasel is clear and straightforward when Amazon’s role in the 
distribution of defective products is examined. 
Amazon undoubtedly benefited economically and reputationally 
from its role in placing defective products into the stream of 
commerce, especially when those products were distributed through 
the FBA service.185 It collects fees from third-party vendors to pay 
for warehousing and order fulfillment.186 It benefits from increased 
site traffic by having a wide-variety of products for sale on its site.187 
It also obtains marketing benefits from the ability to extensively 
brand merchandise it delivers with its own packaging and tape —
 benefits that a newspaper would never enjoy from its classified ads 
section.188 In addition to the physical marketing, Amazon also 
benefits by digitally marketing itself through its open branding on 
the product page and forthright acknowledgment of its role in 
distributing the product.189 The “Prime” designation on products 
                                                 
 184 Id. at 323. 
 185 See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 186 See id. 
 187 See id. 
 188 See id. 
 189 See, e.g., XPRIT Hoverboard w/Bluetooth Speaker (Black), AMAZON, 
https://amzn.to/2IK1DRX (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). Any Amazon product page 
for a FBA product will similarly show Amazon’s logo in the top left corner, as 
well as a statement under the buy-box that says “Sold by [Seller] and Fulfilled by 
Amazon.” Amazon specifically acknowledges part of its role in distribution by 
explaining that “Fulfillment by Amazon (FBA) is a service we offer sellers that 
lets them store their products in Amazon’s fulfillment centers, and we directly 
pack, ship, and provide customer service for these products. Something we hope 
you’ll especially enjoy: FBA items qualify for FREE Shipping and Amazon 
Prime” (emphasis in original) (explanation available when the “Fulfilled by 
Amazon” link is clicked). Id. This particular hoverboard also has an “Amazon’s 
choice” label, which designates that a product is “highly rated, well-priced [and] 
available to ship immediately” (explanation available when the “Amazon’s 
Choice” label is clicked). Id. In the middle of the product page under the “Product 
details” heading there is a sentence directing potential purchasers to a link for 
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using the FBA service could also be seen as an implicit endorsement 
of the quality of the items being sold, and reliance on Amazon’s 
reputation is not unreasonable; in fact, Amazon is one of America’s 
most trusted and beloved companies.190 Amazon further benefits 
from the Prime designation economically by collecting fees from 
Prime members, and its positive reputation grows from fulfilling 
customer orders in a timely fashion.191 
                                                 
warranty information. Id. When that link is followed, a message from Amazon is 
displayed that says, “Please contact the seller directly for warranty information 
for this product. You may also be able to find warranty information on the 
manufacturer’s website.” See Amazon.com message, AMAZON, 
https://amzn.to/1Pp0RGE (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). However, Amazon offers no 
information regarding how to contact the seller or manufacturer. See id. In order 
to contact the seller, XPRITINC, the purchaser must click the XPRIT name in the 
“Sold by XPRIT, Fulfilled by Amazon” link. See id. Next, the purchaser must 
navigate the XPRITINC storefront. See Amazon.com Seller Profile: XPRITINC, 
AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2C1ufjZ (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). From there, the 
purchaser must click the “Ask a Question” button in the top right of the webpage. 
See id. The communication is then handled through Amazon (“IMPORTANT 
NOTICE: When you submit this form, Amazon will replace your email address 
with one provided by Amazon in order to protect your identity, and forward the 
message on your behalf. Amazon will retain copies of all e-mails sent and received 
using this service, including the message you submit below, and may review these 
messages as necessary to resolve disputes. By using this service, you consent to 
this action. Amazon uses filtering technology to protect buyers and sellers and to 
identify possible fraud. Messages that fail this filtering — even if they are not 
fraudulent — will not be transmitted. This form is for use by Amazon customers 
to ask product-related questions of sellers on our third-party platforms (Amazon 
Marketplace and Merchants). The use of this form to send unrelated messages to 
sellers is strictly prohibited.”). Id. 
 190 See Aaron Task, Americans Don’t Just Shop on Amazon, They Also Admire 
and Trust It Too, FORTUNE (June 7, 2016), http://fortune.com/ 
2016/06/07/fortune-500-amazon-survey-monkey-poll/; Karsten Strauss, 
America’s Most Reputable Companies, 2016: Amazon Tops the List, FORBES 
(Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/karstenstrauss/2016/03/29/ 
americas-most-reputable-companies-2016-amazon-tops-the-list/#5e54ea83712f. 
 191 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Equitably Spreading Losses 
Courts have often held that it is not the obligation of the retailer 
to ensure that their products will not cause harm.192 A principal 
justification for the imposition of strict products liability onto 
retailers, however, is that retailers are often in control of the price of 
a product, and therefore in a position well-suited to adjust prices in 
order to compensate for potential liability.193 The courts in Allstate, 
Fox, and Eberhart repeatedly pointed out that Amazon is not in 
control of the price of products sold by third-party vendors.194 
Although it is technically true that Amazon does not directly set the 
price of these products, it exerts significant influence over prices by 
collecting subscription fees, selling fees, per-item fees, and referral 
fees, which are often computed as a percentage of the total purchase 
price of a product, from its third-party vendors.195 Though a 
traditional retailer might directly set the price of a product after 
figuring his own markup, Amazon indirectly sets the price of third-
party products by charging predictable fees that allow the third-party 
vendors to set the overall product price after taking into account 
Amazon’s share and the third-party’s desired markup.196 Therefore, 
Amazon is as well-situated as a traditional retailer to adjust the 
prices of its fees in order to compensate for potential liability. As a 
result, the concerns expressed by the courts in Allstate, Fox, and 
                                                 
 192 See, e.g., Syrie v. Knoll Int’l, 748 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1984); Collins v. Caldor 
of Kingston, Inc., 73 A.D.2d 708 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). 
 193 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964). 
 194 Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); 
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17–2738, 2018 WL 3546197, at 
*8 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018); Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 
2431628, at *2, *8 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018). 
 195 See Selling on Amazon Fee Schedule, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2UmlYBq 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2019) (illustrating that these fees are in addition to the fees 
incurred through FBA). 
 196 See id. Selling fees take into account certain shipping and packaging costs. 
Id. Individual third-party vendors might pay a 99¢ per-item fee for each item sold. 
Id. Professional sellers might pay a monthly subscription fee of $39.99. Id. 
Referral fees are calculated as a percentage of the total purchase price of a product, 
depending on the specific category a product falls into. Id. Most categories impose 
a 15% referral fee, but the percentage can be as high as 45%. See id. Amazon 
collects these fees from the purchase price paid by the consumer, and then remits 
the excess to the third-party vendors. See id. 
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Eberhart are misguided with respect to Amazon’s perceived lack of 
control over product prices—if anything, Amazon exerts 
considerable influence over product prices through its predictable 
and consistent fee structures. 
In any case, the imposition of the strict liability regime upon 
retailers has given rise to products liability insurance for retailers, 
which helps advance the policy goal of loss-spreading.197 It is 
undoubtedly true that the procurement of general liability insurance 
(which usually includes products liability insurance) greatly 
increases the likelihood that a plaintiff will recover, especially 
against a small business who may not have substantial assets.198 On 
the other hand, one of the most salient arguments against this 
suggestion that insurance is perhaps the most appropriate method to 
allocate loss is that, especially for smaller businesses, products 
liability insurance is hardly an option “for the product seller who, 
not because of unacceptable business conduct, cannot procure 
insurance or procure it at a cost which can be passed on to product 
buyers in a way that will keep the cost of the product competitive.”199 
These arguments are not persuasive when applied to Amazon.200 
Amazon already charges Prime customers approximately $120 per 
                                                 
 197 See Vandermark, 391 P.2d at 171–72 (Cal. 1964) (“[T]he retailer himself 
may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a 
position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer’s strict 
liability thus serves as an added incentive to safety. Strict liability on the 
manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured 
plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of 
such protection between them in the course of their continuing business 
relationship.” (emphasis added)); see also Cavico, Jr., supra note 182, at 230. 
 198 See generally Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. OF 
ECON. 120 (1982) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the two major 
types of products liability insurance with respect to negligence-based products 
liability as well as strict products liability). 
 199 See Cavico, Jr., supra note 182, at 231. 
 200 Contra Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 
3546197, at *12 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (“I find that stretching the case law to 
capture Amazon’s activities in this case would conflict with the spirit of the law. 
As the Supreme Court of New Jersey has explained, courts should be cautious in 
expanding the law when doing so ‘would impose a substantial economic burden 
on these businesses and individuals, without necessarily achieving the goal of 
enhanced product safety.’”); but see infra notes 201–03 and accompanying text. 
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year for the service, and one of the main benefits of Prime 
membership is faster access to products fulfilled through the FBA 
or SFP services.201 Simply increasing the cost of Prime membership 
by a nominal amount could cover some defective products liability 
costs Amazon might incur through its roles in directly facilitating 
the distribution of products into the stream of commerce.202 
Additionally, part of the cost of insuring against products liability 
could be borne (and is, perhaps, more appropriately borne) by the 
third-party vendors themselves. In other words, Amazon could 
increase its referral fees to pay for part of the increased costs of 
liability insurance. This would also guarantee some degree of 
indemnification, however indirect, from third-party vendors that are 
unable or unavailable to be held accountable for injuries resulting 
from defective products they sold through Amazon’s site.203 
D.  Revisiting Objections: Isn’t Negligence Enough? 
Those who would oppose the imposition of strict products 
liability to an entity with Amazon’s overall role in the marketing of 
products might object on the grounds that gross negligence is a fair 
standard by which to judge Amazon’s liability. After all, Amazon is 
not clearly a distributor or retailer in all cases, and Amazon likely 
did not cause the products in Part III to be defective. In 
Congressional testimony, one witness stated: 
[Strict products liability] has produced a . . . system which is badly out 
of balance, and utterly lacking in equity and common sense. It no longer 
fairly adjudicates claims based on responsibility. Rather it has become a 
convenient mechanism to pay damages whenever someone is injured. 
Unfortunately, the uncertainty created by this revolutionary change in 
the law has produced a virtual “lottery” for businesses which sell 
products.204 
                                                 
 201 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 202 For a discussion about the pricing of general business liability insurance with 
respect to forecasting claim costs, see Scott E. Harrington & Patricia M. Danzon, 
Price Cutting in Liability Insurance Markets, 67 J. BUS. 511 (1994). 
 203 See infra Part V.D.1 for a brief discussion of the lack of accountability on 
the part of third-party vendors and manufacturers in these products liability cases 
involving Amazon.  
 204 Problems Associated with Product Liability: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 96th 
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However, the extension of strict liability to Amazon is necessary 
because negligence has proven to be an inadequate standard by 
which to promote the policy goals of products liability in general. 
1. The “Unreachable” Problem 
Without reachability, there is no way to hold the true seller or 
manufacturer of a defective product liable for the injuries it might 
cause.205 Especially with regards to products manufactured in China, 
it can be particularly difficult for injured parties to seek recourse 
under American law.206 It is fundamental to the promotion of 
products liability’s policy objectives that an entity in the distribution 
chain of a product be held accountable to injured plaintiffs.207 
Amazon remains unwilling to require enough of its third-party 
vendors to ensure that they are reachable if a product proves 
dangerous. 
For instance, in Allstate, the third-party vendor of the defective 
laptop battery, Lenoge Technology HK Ltd. (known as “E-Life” on 
its Amazon seller account), is not subject to process in the United 
States.208 Therefore, Ms. Wilmot was unable to sue Lenoge to 
recover for the damage caused by its laptop battery, necessitating a 
                                                 
Cong. 353–54 (1979) (statement of William C. McCamant, Vice Chairman of the 
Board, Nat’l Ass’n of Wholesaler-Distributors). 
 205 See Julia A. Phillips, Does “Made in China” Translate to “Watch Out” For 
Consumers? The U.S. Congressional Response to Consumer Product Safety 
Concerns, 27 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 217, 235 (2008). 
 206 See Meghan Josephine Carmody, The Price of Cheap Goods: International 
Trade with China and the Need for Stringent Enforcement of Manufacturing 
Regulations, 34 N.C. J. INT’L. L. 655, 660–86 (2009); see also Joel Slawotsky, 
Liability for Defective Chinese Products Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 7 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 519, 541 nn.8, 18 (2008). 
 207 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 
(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 208 Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197, 
at *4 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (noting that, though Lenoge is not subject to process 
in the United States, Lenoge did agree to indemnify Amazon for any damages 
resulting from the sale of its products in the “Amazon Services Business Solutions 
Agreement” it signed); cf. Cavico, Jr., supra note 182, at 229 (“The imposition of 
strict tort liability upon non-manufacturers is based on the significant rationale 
that retailers and wholesalers are entitled to indemnity from the manufacturer.”). 
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suit against Amazon in order to recover.209 Similarly, in Fox, the 
third-party vendor of the offending hoverboard, called “–DEALS–” 
on its Amazon seller account (W2M Trading Corporation, in reality) 
was unable to be contacted in the aftermath of the hoverboard 
explosion.210 Amazon also does not allow contact between third-
party sellers and buyers using FBA; communication regarding 
customer support or other inquiries must be handled through 
Amazon.211 Although the plaintiffs obtained default judgment 
against W2M Trading Corporation for its failure to appear, W2M 
itself was unlikely to pay for the plaintiffs’ injuries, which 
necessitated the plaintiffs’ action to recover through Amazon 
because the plaintiffs have been unable to contact W2M at all.212 
Additionally, the plaintiffs in Oberdorf were “unable to identify or 
locate a place of operations, contact information, or any agents” for 
the third-party vendor from whom they purchased a defective dog 
leash.213 
In Vandermark, Justice Traynor expounded on the idea that 
retailers should be held liable for injuries caused by defective 
products they sell to their customers.214 “In some cases,” he wrote, 
“the retailer may be the only member of [the overall producing and 
marketing] enterprise reasonably available to the injured 
plaintiff.”215 In FBA transactions where the third-party vendor is so 
far removed from the consumer as to be unreachable, strict liability 
should attach to Amazon as the member of the overall producing 
                                                 
 209 For a fascinating discussion about Chinese manufacturers’ danger to the 
public policy goals of the American strict products liability regime, see Stephen 
Ray Strobel, Made Safely in the USA: Rethinking U.S. Strict Product Liability 
Laws to Counter China, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2012). 
 210 First Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 10–11, Fox v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 2017), 2017 WL 
728025. 
 211 See id. 
 212 Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *1 
(M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018); see also First Amended Complaint, supra note 210, 
at 10–11. 
 213 Complaint at 3–4, Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-01127 
(M.D. Pa. June 13, 2016), 2016 WL 3267591. 
 214 See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964). 
 215 Id. 
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and marketing enterprise most reasonably available to the 
consumer.216 In fact, the plaintiffs in Fox and Allstate assert that they 
reasonably believed that they were purchasing the defective 
products from Amazon itself.217 However inaccurate, this belief is 
reasonable in light of Amazon’s inextricable role in distributing the 
products.218 
If Amazon wants the third-party vendors to be held responsible 
for their defective products, it should require more of the third-party 
vendors it allows to sell products using its FBA service.219 At a 
minimum, Amazon should require them to provide information that 
would allow them to be reached in the event a defective product 
causes harm. Otherwise, according to Justice Traynor’s arguments 
in Vandermark, Amazon should bear the cost of enabling its third-
party vendors to remain unaccountable for injuries caused by their 
defective products.220 
                                                 
 216 See, e.g., Cavico, Jr., supra note 182, at 246 (discussing the potential liability 
of resellers) (“A ‘passive’ reseller, acting as a mere conduit, should not be strictly 
liable as a general rule. However, if a manufacturer cannot be effectively sued and 
a judgment enforced, the reseller should be held to the liability status of the 
manufacturer. Such secondary liability is necessary to minimize a plaintiff being 
left without a liable and solvent defendant. This two-pronged principle of re-seller 
liability evidences an awareness of traditional, utilitarian, and pragmatic tort goals 
and does not offend one’s sense of fairness and justice.”). 
 217 Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197, 
at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (“Ms. Wilmot . . . was under the impression that 
Amazon was the battery seller.”); Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *2 (“Both Mr. and 
Mrs. Fox believed the hoverboard was purchased directly from Amazon.”). 
 218 See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. Such a belief is reasonable 
because of the combination of (1) aggressive Amazon branding around the 
product pages and on the shipping materials, (2) Amazon’s handling of the 
financial transaction, and (3) Amazon’s handling of customer service (because the 
traditional first point of contact for customers experiencing defective products is 
to reach out to the brick-and-mortar retailer they purchased the product from). See 
id. 
 219 See supra notes 197–203 and accompanying text for an alternative method 
by which Amazon could guarantee some degree of indemnification from third-
party vendors that are unreachable by injured plaintiffs. 
 220 See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964). 
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2. Negligent Misrepresentation 
A sub-issue that has repeatedly been raised, especially in 
Oberdorf, and to a lesser extent in Allstate and Eberhart, is that 
Amazon should be held liable under a negligence theory for the 
advertisements or product descriptions written by third-party 
vendors and published on Amazon’s website.221 All three courts 
found that Amazon could not be held liable for written content 
published by third-party vendors, even if it was misleading or 
incorrect, because it was immunized by the Communications 
Decency Act.222 The text of the statute suggests this is the correct 
result.223 However, the legislative history is less clear that the actual 
policy intent behind the Act was to protect online retailers or 
resellers from negligent content posted by third-parties that might 
cause physical harm.224 Legislative action would likely be needed in 
order to either once again restrict the scope of the Act to its original 
intent, or to ameliorate the negative consequences of blanket 
immunization in negligent misrepresentation products liability cases 
by enacting a notice-and-takedown procedure similar to the one in 
                                                 
 221 Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); 
Allstate 2018 WL 3546197, at *12 n.9; Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. 
Supp.3d 496, 502–03 (M.D. Pa. 2017). 
 222 Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 400 n.5; Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *12 
n.9; Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 502–03; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2017) 
(“No provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”). 
 223 Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 400 n.5; see also Amazon.com, Inc.'s Reply to 
Plaintiff’s Response to Amazon’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4–5, Fox v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-03013 2018 WL 2431628 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 
2018), 2018 WL 3409587 (arguing Amazon should be immunized against 
defective third-party vendors’ products) The court did not rule on that specific 
defense, presumably because section 230 acts only to immunize against liability 
resulting from written content, not liability resulting from defective products 
themselves. See Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 
2431628, at *14 n.5 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018). 
 224 See, e.g., Patricia Spiccia, The Best Things in Life Are Not Free: Why 
Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Should Be 
Earned and Not Freely Given, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 386 (2013) (“ . . . the 
legislative history and text of section 230 suggests that the statute’s scope is 
narrow — applying only to defamation claims and good faith efforts to self-
regulate . . . .”). 
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the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.225 The notice-and-takedown 
procedure in a products liability context would require entities like 
Amazon to issue a recall warning for potentially defective products 
already sold and to remove third-party written content pertaining to 
a particular product on their site upon notice that a particular product 
is defective.226 As current law stands, negligent misrepresentation is 
insufficient to protect consumers against potentially harmful third-
party products sold on Amazon. 
3. Negligent Failure to Warn 
Injured plaintiffs might also pursue a negligent failure to warn 
claim against Amazon for defective products purchased on its 
website.227 In Fox, for instance, Amazon had ample notice of a 
pattern of defective hoverboards sold on its site between the date 
that Fox purchased the defective hoverboard on November 3, 2015, 
the date that the hoverboard began to be used by the Foxes on 
December 25, 2015, and the date of the catastrophic fire caused by 
the hoverboard in question on January 9, 2016.228 Yet, despite 
knowing that approximately 250,000 hoverboards were sold on 
Amazon through December 10, 2015, and despite acknowledging 
the possibility of additional potentially dangerous hoverboard 
malfunctions after they were opened on December 25, 2015, 
Amazon declined to recall the hoverboards.229 Instead, it merely sent 
a “non-alarmist” email that failed to mention the specific safety 
                                                 
 225 The notice-and-takedown procedure in a products liability context would 
require entities like Amazon to remove products it knows to be harmful. See 17 
U.S.C. § 512 (2017). 
 226 This would necessarily require Amazon to also suspend sales of the 
defective product until the third-party vendor updates its content to include 
sufficient warning. 
 227 For a discussion of the existing approaches to a post-sale duty to warn, 
especially with respect to the doctrine’s potential burdens on manufacturers and 
distributors, see generally Victor E. Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two 
Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892 
(1983). 
 228 Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *2–
5 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018); see also supra notes 115–19 and accompanying 
text. 
 229 Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *4. 
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concerns that Amazon knew the hoverboards to have, such as their 
significant fire-risk or risk of explosion.230 
The court in Fox, however, dismissed the failure to warn claim 
on the grounds that Tennessee courts do not recognize any post-sale 
duty to warn.231 Even if Tennessee courts did recognize a post-sale 
duty to warn, the Restatement attaches this duty only to sellers and 
distributors.232 Because the court in Fox declined to recognize 
Amazon as a seller or distributor under the Tennessee PLA, it seems 
unlikely that it would reverse course and find that Amazon had a 
duty to warn the Foxes about the potential dangers of the hoverboard 
they purchased from its site.233 However, in jurisdictions where the 
post-sale duty to warn is acknowledged, Amazon might be found 
negligent if its substantial role in placing products onto the 
consumer market is recognized. Therefore, in limited circumstances, 
and if the appropriate factual conclusions regarding Amazon’s 
distribution role are reached, this theory of negligence may be 
sufficient to protect consumers. Yet, the current inability of 
negligence theories to provide injured consumers with some degree 
of recompense highlights the urgency with which the current strict 
products liability regime must evolve. 
E.  Recognizing the Need for Evolution in Strict Products 
Liability 
It is impractical to assert that Amazon should be held strictly 
liable for every potentially defective product sold on its site. The 
number of products listed on its United States marketplace alone is 
in excess of 500 million separate listings.234 Of course, it is more 
                                                 
 230 See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text (noting Amazon was 
specifically aware of seventeen separate fire or explosion incidents involving the 
hoverboards in question). 
 231 Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *9–10 (citing, inter alia, Irion v. Sun Lighting, 
Inc., No. M2002–00766–COAR3–CV, 2004 WL 746823, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Apr. 7, 2004)). 
 232 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB., supra note 1, at  § 10. 
 233 See supra notes 159–60, 185–91 and accompanying text for an analysis of 
why Amazon should be considered a seller or distributor given its FBA service. 
 234 How Many Products Does Amazon Sell? – January 2018, SCRAPEHERO 
(Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.scrapehero.com/many-products-amazon-sell-
january-2018/. At the same time, this recent development is not suggesting that 
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clear that Amazon is already strictly liable for defective products 
sold under its own name, while it is not strictly liable for defective 
products distributed by the FBM method, because its contact with 
the product and overall responsibility for placing the product on the 
market are minimal.235 Problematically though, Amazon is not 
currently strictly liable for products sold through its FBA service, 
and plaintiffs injured by these products have had little luck in 
holding a responsible party accountable.236 The distribution chain 
analysis currently employed by courts to impose strict liability no 
longer makes sense in the modern economy, and tort law should 
evolve to match changed circumstances.237 
The essential purpose of the distribution chain analysis is to hold 
strictly liable the entities that are most responsible for placing 
defective products into the hands of consumers.238 It is apparent that 
                                                 
the mere quantity of product listings an entity maintains is any basis on which to 
resist the due extension of strict liability. For instance, department stores and big-
box stores also offer large quantities of products for which they would be held 
strictly liable for. The typical Walmart brick-and-mortar store, as an example, 
carries around 120,000 products, and Walmart’s online store carries more than 35 
million products. Matthew Boyle, Wal-Mart to Discount One Million Online 
Items Picked Up in Stores, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-12/wal-mart-to-discount-1-
million-online-items-picked-up-in-stores (subscription required). 
 235 See Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 501 (M.D. Pa. 
2017) (explaining that, here, Amazon’s minimal role in bringing the offending 
dog leash to market is more comparable to a newspaper classified ads section; 
therefore, it is not strictly liable for injuries caused by the dog leash). 
 236 See Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 
3546197, at *4 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (“[T]he record does not reflect that [the 
third-party vendor] was subject to process in [the United States].)”; see also Fox, 
2018 WL2431628, at *1, *3 (noting the plaintiffs obtained default judgment 
against the third-party vendor for failure to appear, and finding that Amazon did 
not allow contact between the third-party vendor and the consumer before, during, 
or after the hoverboard purchase); cf. Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 498 (stating 
that although the third-party vendor did not utilize the FBA service, the plaintiff 
was still unable to make contact with it after the defective product caused her 
injury). 
 237 For a related discussion of why antitrust law should also evolve to match the 
modern e-commerce economy dominated by Amazon, see generally Khan, supra 
note 139. 
 238 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (“The 
purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from 
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Amazon is more responsible for the overall marketing and 
distribution of a product than a mere auctioneer, advertising agency, 
or sales representative.239 Arguably, Amazon is as equally 
responsible for the injection of the product into the stream of 
commerce as the third-party vendor that posted it for sale through 
Amazon and contracted with Amazon to fulfill it. Amazon is the 
final entity to provide an advertising platform, collect payment on, 
and handle a product before the carrier delivers it to the consumer 
in an FBA transaction. It is also potentially the only accurately 
named, reliably identifiable entity in the FBA sales process; third-
party vendors are asked to use a “friendly” name as the display-name 
on their Amazon seller account, which can conceal the true identity 
of the seller.240 Moreover, Amazon is the most easily reached entity 
in the process; for instance, in Fox, the third-party seller of the 
hoverboard was impossible for the Foxes to contact in the wake of 
their injuries, and the true manufacturer was impossible to 
ascertain.241 
For these reasons, it may be more loyal to the policy motivations 
behind strict products liability to shift from a “distribution chain” 
analysis to an inquiry more focused on determining the degree to 
which any given entity is responsible for placing a defective product 
on the consumer market.242 When this analysis is superimposed onto 
the facts of Allstate, Fox, and Eberhart, Amazon is clearly meant to 
                                                 
defective products are borne by the [party] that put such products on the market 
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.”). 
 239 See supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text. 
 240 See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text; see also Vandermark v. 
Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1964) (arguing that retailers should be 
strictly liable for defective products because the retailer may be the most 
“reasonably available” party in an enterprise). Here, where Amazon is often the 
only member of the enterprise that is reasonably identifiable by name and/ or 
location to the consumer, it follows that Amazon should be held strictly liable for 
defective products sold on its marketplace. 
 241 See supra notes 109–22 and accompanying text. 
 242 See, e.g., Weber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 630 F. Supp. 285, 288 (D.N.J. 
1986) (recognizing that courts should employ a “stream of commerce” analysis to 
determine whether strict products liability is appropriate, rather than any physical 
“touch” requirement). 
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be held strictly liable for the injuries caused by defective products it 
helped place on the market. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The factual question that courts must grapple with is whether 
Amazon’s Fulfillment by Amazon service is so inextricably tied in 
with the direct facilitation of potentially defective products that it 
should be held strictly liable for injuries resulting from them. To the 
extent that Amazon’s role is comparable to the role of traditional 
brick-and-mortar retailers in supplying potentially defective 
products to the consumer market, Amazon should be held to a 
comparable legal standard of accountability when consumers are 
injured. However, Amazon continues to defy the traditional legal 
understanding of what type of entities constitute distributors and 
retailers. Nevertheless, the policy underpinnings of strict products 
liability are still applicable in evaluating Amazon’s potential 
responsibility to the consumer market at large. 
The emerging trend of not holding Amazon strictly liable for 
defective products sold on its website and fulfilled through its FBA 
service raises substantial questions with respect to the overarching 
policy goals of tort law, including deterrence, loss distribution, 
corrective justice, and social responsibility. From a policy 
perspective, the essential question is whether or not the current strict 
products liability regime satisfactorily accomplishes those goals. 
Courts reviewing these cases might consider refocusing their inquiry 
on the original objectives of the American strict products liability 
regime. In so doing, they would show a willingness to allow the 
common law to naturally evolve in tandem with the modern 
economy.243 
                                                 
 243 See Roger J. Traynor, The Supreme Court’s Watch on the Law, in 2 HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OF CALIFORNIA 1900-1950, 207, 211 (J. 
Edward Johnson ed., 1966) (“There are always some who note with alarm any 
appellate opinion that goes beyond a mechanical canvass of more or less 
established precedents. They include the diehards, dead set against all but familiar 
routines. They include the slothful, who would rationalize their own inertia. They 
also include carpers hostile toward any enlightenment, who would knowingly 
impair judicial vigil by keeping the visibility low. Slyly they equate justice with 
the blindfold image without articulating the corollary that decision would then be 
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reduced to a blind toss of the coin. They do not state how problematic are the 
problems that reach the Supreme Court, and how great the need for judicial 
reasoning beyond formulas.”). 
